Karl Denninger [SMTP:karl@Mcs.Net] wrote around Sunday, May 04, 1997 12:57 PM (in some timezone, my mail client is useless):
As long as the Internet's cache files on each and every system out there point at "a" in their file, there is the potential to break the namespace.
One rogue server in a confederation will cause serious problems.
NSI has defacto control, because getting them out of the cache files is a long and slow process, and until they ARE out their answers will be believed.
That's one of the nice things about widespread backing of the IAHC plan by the big players. It wouldn't be hard for them to blackhole the cached rogue servers and thus cut them out of the loop. No doubt Karl will invoke lawyers at this, but while people are running around seeking injunctions to support their own lawlessness, the net keeps running. I would think that network operators could argue this is no different from filtering out rogue routes coming in from a subverted BGP peer. Geoffrey
On Sun, May 04, 1997 at 01:32:05PM -0700, Geoffrey Waigh wrote:
Karl Denninger [SMTP:karl@Mcs.Net] wrote around Sunday, May 04, 1997 12:57 PM (in some timezone, my mail client is useless):
As long as the Internet's cache files on each and every system out there point at "a" in their file, there is the potential to break the namespace.
One rogue server in a confederation will cause serious problems.
NSI has defacto control, because getting them out of the cache files is a long and slow process, and until they ARE out their answers will be believed.
That's one of the nice things about widespread backing of the IAHC plan by the big players. It wouldn't be hard for them to blackhole the cached rogue servers and thus cut them out of the loop. No doubt Karl will invoke lawyers at this, but while people are running around seeking injunctions to support their own lawlessness, the net keeps running. I would think that network operators could argue this is no different from filtering out rogue routes coming in from a subverted BGP peer.
Geoffrey
You're talking about blackholing the routes, or the nameservers (ie: bogusns lines)? Blackholing the routes would be, IMHO a serious legal issue. Bogusnsing the root would do nothing, since 40,000 people would have to do it (and that simply won't happen). - -- Karl Denninger (karl@MCS.Net)| MCSNet - The Finest Internet Connectivity http://www.mcs.net/~karl | T1's from $600 monthly to FULL DS-3 Service | 99 Analog numbers, 77 ISDN, http://www.mcs.net/ Voice: [+1 312 803-MCS1 x219]| NOW Serving 56kbps DIGITAL on our analog lines! Fax: [+1 312 803-4929] | 2 FULL DS-3 Internet links; 400Mbps B/W Internal
At 2:12 AM -0700 5/5/97, Karl Denninger wrote:
Blackholing the routes would be, IMHO a serious legal issue.
Since it is a technique already in significant use and gaining in popularity, its application to this context raises no new legal questions. d/ -------------------- Dave Crocker +1 408 246 8253 Brandenburg Consulting fax: +1 408 249 6205 675 Spruce Dr. dcrocker@brandenburg.com Sunnyvale CA 94086 USA http://www.brandenburg.com Internet Mail Consortium http://www.imc.org, info@imc.org
participants (3)
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Dave Crocker -
Geoffrey Waigh -
Karl Denninger