It should also be noted that the CAIDA study only examined the core "giant cluster" of the Internet. In other words they only looked at the most interconnected part of the Internet not the whole Internet. While you could argue only the core matters, the methodological approach gives you much different results. You are ignoring the places that were disconnected or balkanized in other studies (Albert et al 2000, Cohen et al 2002...etc.) CAIDA are the data gurus, so I'm sure there is good justification for this, it is just not outline in their paper - http://www.caida.org/analysis/topology/resilience/ ----- Original Message ----- From: Sean Donelan <sean@donelan.com> Date: Monday, November 18, 2002 0:55 am Subject: Re: Simulated disaster exercise? Re: PAIX

...

...

The usual response was it only affected the public exchange fabric, not any private point-to-point circuits between providers through

On Sun, 17 Nov 2002, Richard A Steenbergen wrote: the same

...

...

facility.

But if we're going to compare this to MAE Gigaswitch failures, shouldn't> we be talking apples to apples and oranges to oranges?

No. The world has changed. If people are buying tangerines and grapefruitnow, that's what we should be talking about, not apples and oranges. If most of today's Internet exchange is via private connections, those are the connections we should be looking at.

The fine folks at Caimis and Caida have done some analysis, and identifiedthe nodes which make up the "core" of the Internet. They've also identified the most connected "core" nodes. The good news is the networkdoesn't go non-linear until more than 25% of the nodes are removed.