Can there be a confirmation of this? I see no such MOTD at http://www.panix.com/panix/help/Announcements/ and my connection to panix is fine and route I see is 166.84.0.0/17 with origin in 2033. I also checked at routeviews.org and similarly all their peers see origin in in 2033. Is there some other route that has been hijacked then or has it now ben resolved? BTW - Its interesting to note that its almost exactly one year after their domain hijacking which happened on weekend of Jan 15 & 16, 2005 (friday jan 14th to be more precise). On Sun, 22 Jan 2006, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:

This is hardly as serious as the last incident -- but, well, some people do seem to have all the luck, eh?

Of course, there are measures one can take against this sort of thing; but it's hard to deploy some of them effectively when the party stealing your routes was in fact once authorized to offer them, and its own peers may be explicitly allowing them in filter lists (which, I think, is the case here). Sometimes "budget" network connectivity isn't -- even when you've already realized that and turned off the tap!

The text below is what's currently in the MOTD on Panix's NetBSD hosts:

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Con Ed 'stealing' Panix routes (alexis) Sun Jan 22 12:38:16 2006

All Panix services are currently unreachable from large portions of the Internet (though not all of it). This is because Con Ed Communications, a competence-challenged ISP in New York, is announcing our routes to the Internet. In English, that means that they are claiming that all our traffic should be passing through them, when of course it should not. Those portions of the net that are "closer" (in network topology terms) to Con Ed will send them our traffic, which makes us unreachable.

We are taking several steps to deal with this: 1) We are announcing "more specific" routes to our peers. More specific routes are always preferred. However, we have to contact network admins at those peers to get them to change their route filters, before this workaround will be effective. 2) We are attempting to reach Con Ed Communications. Unfortunately, so far we've been unable to do so. They don't seem to answer their phones on Sunday. 3) We are attempting to reach Verio, which is "upstream" from Con Ed, because they could (and should!!) choose to ignore the rogue routes from Con Ed.

Since all of these depend on humans outside of Panix, we can't give a specific time at which we expect this problem to be worked around (I don't expect a real resolution for a while, because Con Ed is hopeless, but the workaround will be perfect until then). But we do expect to be able to reach responsible parties at our peers within a few hours at most. We don't know how long it will take for them to change their filters, but that's not a challenging job technically, so we hope it won't take long.

I'll post another MOTD as soon as we know anything more.

Folx, On Sun, Jan 22, 2006 at 06:09:08PM +0000, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:

This is hardly as serious as the last incident -- but, well, some people do seem to have all the luck, eh?

From where I'm standing this situation looks much more serious than the last one. It looks like Con Edison (AS27506) hijacked several prefixes other than just Panix's, and I'm not sure that they're done announcing them yet. I see ~70 new prefixes, many of whom are customers of Con Edison, but about 25 of these appear to have no previous relationship to 27506).

I won't bore people with to many details here (unless there is great interest) but a quick, rough-n-ready analysis is up at http://www.renesys.com/blog/2006/01/coned_steals_the_net.shtml for those that are curious. (For those that don't want to read it, I think one main punchline is that Con Edison spewed a bunch of routes they didn't own and UUNet and Verio believed them). Please let me know if you see errors in there. t. -- _____________________________________________________________________ todd underwood chief of operations & security renesys - internet intelligence todd@renesys.com www.renesys.com