On Mon, 21 May 2007, Fergie wrote:

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- -- "Chris L. Morrow" <christopher.morrow@verizonbusiness.com> wrote:

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So, I think that what we (security folks) want is probably not to auto-squish domains in the TLD because of NS's moving about at some rate other than 'normal' but to be able to ask for a quick takedown of said domain, yes? I don't think we'll be able to reduce false positive rates low enough to be acceptable with an 'auto-squish' method :(

Hi Chris,

While I agree with you, there are many of us who know that these fast-flux hosts are malicious due to malware & malicious traffic analysis...

Oh, so we switched from 'the domain is bad because..' to 'the hosts using the domain are bad because...' I wasn't assuming some piece of intel at the TLD that told the TLD that 'hostX that was just named NS for domain foo.bar is also compromised'. I was assuming a s'simple' system of 'changing NS's X times in Y period == bad'. I admit that's a might naive, but given the number, breadth, content, operators of lists of 'bad things' on the internet today I'm not sure I'd rely on them for a global decision making process, especially if I were a TLD operator potentially liable for removal of a domain used to process real business :(

I completely agree with you, however, on the issue of making assumptions that it will always be malicious -- of course, that will not always be the case. :-)

agreed.