Re: Backbone Infrastructure and Secrecy
Are we going to throw a burlap sack over 60 Hudson, the Westin Building, One Wilshire, or similar buildings and disavow knowledge of their existence? You can't hide major infrastructure.
Yes. However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it is harder for terrorists to find a single point of failure to attack. If they have to coordinate an attack on 3 or 4 locations, there is an increased probability that something will go wrong (as on 9/11) and one or more of their targets will escape total destruction. We all need to find ways to make our networks more resilient even if that means moving away from "comfortable" vendors like Cisco and Juniper. The costs of resilience are not immovable objects. Those costs arise because the routers and circuits we would use to implement resilience are the same things we use to carry paying traffic and the vendors price their products based on the expectation that we use them for paying traffic. Since the vendors can't tell whether or not the router/circuit earns revenue for us, they won't give up their margin on the sale. In both cases, the underlying components of the product are virtual commodities (fiber, wavelengths, circuit boards, chips) and are continually dropping in price. Perhaps it will require government regulations regarding diversity and resilience to change this but wouldn't it be nice if the industry could get together and solve this problem in a self-regulatory fashion? --Michael Dillon
Michael.Dillon@radianz.com wrote:
However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it is harder for terrorists to find a single point of failure to attack. If they have to coordinate an attack on 3 or 4 locations, there is an increased probability that something will go wrong (as on 9/11) and one or more of their targets will escape total destruction.
I like maps with circles on them. Triangles are usually good too. Mostly, I like to see lots of interconnecting lines. The last I checked, there are at least two interconnect houses in each city. This is true of data and telco layouts. Critical networks tend to interconnect multiple cities as well. The wonderful thing about what we created is that just because you shut down an exchange, doesn't mean you shut down the network. You can remove Telehouse and even those networks who's connectivity in the area you've killed can offload traffic via other interconnects. Granted, this means more money spent as traffic raises on other routes. Granted, there are ways to limit local damage, but those are usually secondary to the overall network and a little manual intervention can usually bring an emergency circuit up in a local market. Do you think the destruction of telehouse would have everyone else saying, "I'm sorry and sympathetic to your needs, but we just don't have the time right now to let you through this fiber path or place equipment in our facility." -Jack (learns about interconnects which are thousands of miles away, of no use to his network, but which he hopes to be lucky enough to see someday)
On Wed, 9 Jul 2003, Jack Bates wrote: : : Michael.Dillon@radianz.com wrote: : > However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it is : > harder for terrorists to find a single point of failure to attack. If they : > have to coordinate an attack on 3 or 4 locations, there is an increased : > probability that something will go wrong (as on 9/11) and one or more of : > their targets will escape total destruction. : interconnect multiple cities as well. The wonderful thing about what we : created is that just because you shut down an exchange, doesn't mean you : shut down the network. You can remove Telehouse and even those networks : who's connectivity in the area you've killed can offload traffic via : other interconnects. Granted, this means more money spent as traffic : raises on other routes. : : Granted, there are ways to limit local damage, but those are usually : secondary to the overall network and a little manual intervention can : usually bring an emergency circuit up in a local market. Do you think : the destruction of telehouse would have everyone else saying, "I'm sorry : and sympathetic to your needs, but we just don't have the time right now : to let you through this fiber path or place equipment in our facility." : : : -Jack (learns about interconnects which are thousands of miles away, of : no use to his network, but which he hopes to be lucky enough to see someday) : :
Michael.Dillon@radianz.com wrote:
However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it is harder for terrorists to find a single point of failure to attack. If they have to coordinate an attack on 3 or 4 locations, there is an increased probability that something will go wrong (as on 9/11) and one or more of their targets will escape total destruction.
I hate to be a doom sayer, but any chump with a couple of tools and rudimentary knowledge can lift manholes, cut cables and jump to another location in minutes. No amount of diversity could defend against a concerted attack like that unless you start installing very special low-level routes away from street level into many many buildings. Maybe you guys in the US are historically more paranoid, but London is just covered in single points of major failure for telecoms. Protecting the switching centres (IP or voice) looks great, but walk a few hundred feet and all senblence of physical security breaks. Peter
On Wed, Jul 09, 2003 at 05:30:27PM +0100, Peter Galbavy wrote:
I hate to be a doom sayer, but any chump with a couple of tools and rudimentary knowledge can lift manholes, cut cables and jump to another location in minutes. ...
Perhaps it's time for IDS on manholes? But really, since the gas lines are down there too, is fiber the chief worry? -- Barney Wolff http://www.databus.com/bwresume.pdf I'm available by contract or FT, in the NYC metro area or via the 'Net.
I recall reading, last year, about a "Cyber Bunker" outside London UK which is being offered as colo to major banks. The banks were raving praise about it. This facility is an ex-RAF centralized radar control site, buried dozens of feet underground w/ thick concrete and designed to withstand nuclear weapon overpressure. Blast doors, EMF shielding, dual-redundant air filtered generators, the works. The people who bought it and turned it into a colo neglected to mention one thing: It's in the middle of a farm field with a single homed fiber route to Telehouse Docklands. Anyone have a backhoe? *snip* DIVERSE ROUTES, people! At 05:30 PM 7/9/2003 +0100, you wrote:
Michael.Dillon@radianz.com wrote:
However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it is harder for terrorists to find a single point of failure to attack. If they have to coordinate an attack on 3 or 4 locations, there is an increased probability that something will go wrong (as on 9/11) and one or more of their targets will escape total destruction.
I hate to be a doom sayer, but any chump with a couple of tools and rudimentary knowledge can lift manholes, cut cables and jump to another location in minutes. No amount of diversity could defend against a concerted attack like that unless you start installing very special low-level routes away from street level into many many buildings. Maybe you guys in the US are historically more paranoid, but London is just covered in single points of major failure for telecoms.
Protecting the switching centres (IP or voice) looks great, but walk a few hundred feet and all senblence of physical security breaks.
Peter
On Wed, 9 Jul 2003, Eric Kuhnke wrote:
I recall reading, last year, about a "Cyber Bunker" outside London UK which is being offered as colo to major banks. The banks were raving praise about it. This facility is an ex-RAF centralized radar control site, buried dozens of feet underground w/ thick concrete and designed to withstand nuclear weapon overpressure. Blast doors, EMF shielding, dual-redundant air filtered generators, the works.
In the US, American Tower is/was liquidating a number of cold war era ex-AT&T blast-proof sites. They are all in need of an upgrade, but the basics are there (underground, multiple layers of concrete, blast doors, etc. Even "blast toilets". I'm surprised some enterprising/paranoid soul has not snatched a few of these up and converted them into secure offsite storage. Even without diverse routes, you can ensure safe data storage. Charles
The people who bought it and turned it into a colo neglected to mention one thing: It's in the middle of a farm field with a single homed fiber route to Telehouse Docklands.
Anyone have a backhoe? *snip*
DIVERSE ROUTES, people!
At 05:30 PM 7/9/2003 +0100, you wrote:
Michael.Dillon@radianz.com wrote:
However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it is harder for terrorists to find a single point of failure to attack. If they have to coordinate an attack on 3 or 4 locations, there is an increased probability that something will go wrong (as on 9/11) and one or more of their targets will escape total destruction.
I hate to be a doom sayer, but any chump with a couple of tools and rudimentary knowledge can lift manholes, cut cables and jump to another location in minutes. No amount of diversity could defend against a concerted attack like that unless you start installing very special low-level routes away from street level into many many buildings. Maybe you guys in the US are historically more paranoid, but London is just covered in single points of major failure for telecoms.
Protecting the switching centres (IP or voice) looks great, but walk a few hundred feet and all senblence of physical security breaks.
Peter
On Wed, 9 Jul 2003, Eric Kuhnke wrote:
In the US, American Tower is/was liquidating a number of cold war era ex-AT&T blast-proof sites. They are all in need of an upgrade, but the basics are there (underground, multiple layers of concrete, blast doors, etc. Even "blast toilets". I'm surprised some enterprising/paranoid soul has not snatched a few of these up and converted them into secure offsite storage. Even without diverse routes, you can ensure safe data storage.
Keep your data in Roswell! http://albany.bizjournals.com/albuquerque/stories/2003/03/31/story3.html Only bad part, is the ILEC doesn't have the facility to bring T1s to the site (let alone anything bigger). They are, however, about 1/2 mile from the border of one of the independents -- I believe they're being served via some type of wireless.
Now that most of the Atlas missile sites have been sold, how about a 1400 acre salt mine located 1200 feet under the city of Detroit? http://www.detnews.com/history/salt/salt.htm It's probably a bit easier to get high quality bandwidth to Detroit than Roswell, NM. Also has the advantage of being across the river from Windsor ON for diverse connections to Shaw Bigpipe, Telus, Bell, GT/360, etc. Or 1,180,000 sq ft of underground warehouse located between Indianapolis and Louisville: http://www.marengowarehouse.com/ On another note, some people affiliated with the SeattleWireless community wireless MAN have purchased one of those former AT&T microwave relay sites from American Tower. Mt. Baldi was formerly part of a microwave relay from downtown seattle, across the Cascade mountain range to cities such as Yakima and Spokane. Anyone interested in colocating at 4,000 foot altitude on top of a mountain? I believe access is by snowmobile from late November to mid March. :) http://www.seattlewireless.net/index.cgi/MtBaldi http://www.altaphon.com/Enumclaw/ At 09:01 PM 7/9/2003 -0600, you wrote:
On Wed, 9 Jul 2003, Eric Kuhnke wrote:
In the US, American Tower is/was liquidating a number of cold war era ex-AT&T blast-proof sites. They are all in need of an upgrade, but the basics are there (underground, multiple layers of concrete, blast doors, etc. Even "blast toilets". I'm surprised some enterprising/paranoid soul has not snatched a few of these up and converted them into secure offsite storage. Even without diverse routes, you can ensure safe data storage.
Keep your data in Roswell!
http://albany.bizjournals.com/albuquerque/stories/2003/03/31/story3.html
Only bad part, is the ILEC doesn't have the facility to bring T1s to the site (let alone anything bigger). They are, however, about 1/2 mile from the border of one of the independents -- I believe they're being served via some type of wireless.
PG> Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2003 17:30:27 +0100 PG> From: Peter Galbavy PG> Protecting the switching centres (IP or voice) looks great, PG> but walk a few hundred feet and all senblence of physical But those biometric handscanners are so cool! They look like something from a movie! High tech! Perhaps some "security" measures have a different purpose -- as you say, "LOOKS great" (emphasis added). Eddy -- Brotsman & Dreger, Inc. - EverQuick Internet Division Bandwidth, consulting, e-commerce, hosting, and network building Phone: +1 (785) 865-5885 Lawrence and [inter]national Phone: +1 (316) 794-8922 Wichita _________________________________________________________________ DO NOT send mail to the following addresses : blacklist@brics.com -or- alfra@intc.net -or- curbjmp@intc.net Sending mail to spambait addresses is a great way to get blocked.
E.B. Dreger wrote:
Perhaps some "security" measures have a different purpose -- as you say, "LOOKS great" (emphasis added).
Just like 99% of all recent airport security measures... reassure the sheep, then they might stop bleating and march to order instead. "Baaaaaauy McDonalds, Baaaaauy Gas, Baaaaauy SUV". This is OT. Obviously. Peter
Managing security perception can sometimes reduce security risks or the security TCO, by reducing the number of low-risk attackers. Die-hards will only stop for real security controls, but you may find easier to impose such controls without a lot of noise from your security alarms. The real issue is when you start believing that you are as safe as the sheep think you are. Rubens ----- Original Message ----- From: "Peter Galbavy" <peter.galbavy@knowtion.net> To: "E.B. Dreger" <eddy+public+spam@noc.everquick.net>; <nanog@merit.edu> Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2003 1:16 PM Subject: Re: Backbone Infrastructure and Secrecy | | E.B. Dreger wrote: | > Perhaps some "security" measures have a different purpose -- as | > you say, "LOOKS great" (emphasis added). | | Just like 99% of all recent airport security measures... reassure the sheep, | then they might stop bleating and march to order instead. "Baaaaaauy | McDonalds, Baaaaauy Gas, Baaaaauy SUV". | | This is OT. Obviously. | | Peter | |
participants (10)
-
Barney Wolff -
Charles Sprickman -
E.B. Dreger -
Eric Kuhnke -
Jack Bates -
John Osmon -
Michael.Dillon＠radianz.com -
Peter Galbavy -
Rubens Kuhl Jr. -
Scott Weeks