"Alex.Bligh" <amb@xara.net> writes:

Failing this, the ability to disable responding to packets (*) with source route set on the Cisco *host* TCP/IP stack (and continue to forward them),

Mourn the death of TUBA telnet... :) What you might want is to make sure that management functions can only happen over a separate private IP network. This has been a long-time engineering goal of one network at some priority or other. Then, some protection for routing protocols to make them both more robust and more secure, and life is a bit nicer. (Although taking an axe to all the routing protocols in use today has a strong appeal, actually, but that'll come later...) Unfortunately, though, in the absence of a method to query routers about their forwarding (i.e., "what would you do with this traffic profile?"), route calculation and NLRI redistribution policies, any tool which can help infer that from anywhere in the Internet is of use. I hate traceroute, I think it's a dreadful hack, and it is really hard to use it correctly for all sorts of reasons, lots of them having to do with the observer problem. LSRR helps enormously, and has been of critical use in the past. Killing it off to provide some warm fuzzies to operators who are still going to be exposed to lots of serious attacks on their routers and hosts strikes me as nearly as unreasonable as simply turning off routers and encasing them in concrete to make them safe. What would be REALLY nice is if lots of new hardware and software that doesn't keel over dead or use a really slow path to forward packets decorated with the LSRR option were deployed in everyone's networks. Sean.