ISP contracts and government intervention
Apologies in advance for the non-technical nature of the query. I am a law student researching a law review article on censorship on the Internet. My partner and I are investigating the legal consequences of placing a ISP offshore, in a jurisdiction like Anguilla, Nevis, the Caymen Islands or some other place like that. Part of our problem is that we're ignorant of the business practice in the area. I figured I'd go to the horse's mouth, rather than playing footsie on the legal lists. Its probable that the ISP could be run in an offshore jursidiction with strong financial secrecy regulations and any U.S.-based managers/owners would be insulated from legal action because they could not be identified (at least, with American subponeas.) On the other hand, a U.S. judge could presumably order the offshore ISP's U.S.-based upstream ISP to cut off that ISP (or even the entire jurisdiction, depending on the situation) for DMCA violations, gambling, etc. Basically, its an issue of how the community would go about dealing with a blackhat ISP. An initial question is how closely do backbone providers/upstream ISPs look at offshore ISPs to begin with? What kind of identification/credentials does an ISP need to come up with to get a contract? Specifically, do backbone providers figure out who the beneficial owner of an ISP is before they hook up the ISP? If someone pays the bills regularly, do they need anything more than what's in whois.arin.net? The next set of questions deal with how long a blackhat ISP could stay connected. Under what circumstances would an upstream ISP/backbone provider cut off the offshore ISP before a court order? What are the choices in the market for backbone providers that are not U.S.-based (and therefore wouldn't be subject to U.S. legal process)? Free, encrypted, secure Web-based email at www.hushmail.com
Ethan, "blackhat" seems a strong term for an ISP that wishes to operate without government interference. There are many ISPs that are not US based, and many ISPs that would provide service to anyone with cash, as long as a court order does not exist to prevent or stop suck service. The only "credentials" someone needs is a positive return on a Dun and Bradstreet credit report. Paying in advance tends to get around even that. Check out HavenCo, and it's purpose. I think it may be the sort of thing you are looking for, although I would certainly never call it a "blackhat" operation, as it is completely above board, just not interested in government (over)regulation. ("hats" are for hackers. I don't think you'll find many folks who wear such figurative headgear on NANOG) - Daniel Golding
-----Original Message----- From: owner-nanog@merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu]On Behalf Of ethanpreston@hushmail.com Sent: Monday, July 02, 2001 2:16 AM To: nanog@merit.edu Subject: ISP contracts and government intervention
Apologies in advance for the non-technical nature of the query. I am a law student researching a law review article on censorship on the Internet. My partner and I are investigating the legal consequences of placing a ISP offshore, in a jurisdiction like Anguilla, Nevis, the Caymen Islands or some other place like that. Part of our problem is that we're ignorant of the business practice in the area. I figured I'd go to the horse's mouth, rather than playing footsie on the legal lists.
Its probable that the ISP could be run in an offshore jursidiction with strong financial secrecy regulations and any U.S.-based managers/owners would be insulated from legal action because they could not be identified (at least, with American subponeas.) On the other hand, a U.S. judge could presumably order the offshore ISP's U.S.-based upstream ISP to cut off that ISP (or even the entire jurisdiction, depending on the situation) for DMCA violations, gambling, etc. Basically, its an issue of how the community would go about dealing with a blackhat ISP.
An initial question is how closely do backbone providers/upstream ISPs look at offshore ISPs to begin with? What kind of identification/credentials does an ISP need to come up with to get a contract? Specifically, do backbone providers figure out who the beneficial owner of an ISP is before they hook up the ISP? If someone pays the bills regularly, do they need anything more than what's in whois.arin.net?
The next set of questions deal with how long a blackhat ISP could stay connected. Under what circumstances would an upstream ISP/backbone provider cut off the offshore ISP before a court order? What are the choices in the market for backbone providers that are not U.S.-based (and therefore wouldn't be subject to U.S. legal process)?
Free, encrypted, secure Web-based email at www.hushmail.com
order does not exist to prevent or stop suck service. The only
This should say "such service". Freudian slip, perhaps.
"credentials" someone needs is a positive return on a Dun and Bradstreet credit report. Paying in advance tends to get around even that.
Check out HavenCo, and it's purpose. I think it may be the sort of thing you are looking for, although I would certainly never call it a "blackhat" operation, as it is completely above board, just not interested in government (over)regulation.
("hats" are for hackers. I don't think you'll find many folks who wear such figurative headgear on NANOG)
- Daniel Golding
-----Original Message----- From: owner-nanog@merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu]On Behalf Of ethanpreston@hushmail.com Sent: Monday, July 02, 2001 2:16 AM To: nanog@merit.edu Subject: ISP contracts and government intervention
Apologies in advance for the non-technical nature of the query. I am a law student researching a law review article on censorship on the Internet. My partner and I are investigating the legal consequences of placing a ISP offshore, in a jurisdiction like Anguilla, Nevis, the Caymen Islands or some other place like that. Part of our problem is that we're ignorant of the business practice in the area. I figured I'd go to the horse's mouth, rather than playing footsie on the legal lists.
Its probable that the ISP could be run in an offshore jursidiction with strong financial secrecy regulations and any U.S.-based managers/owners would be insulated from legal action because they could not be identified (at least, with American subponeas.) On the other hand, a U.S. judge could presumably order the offshore ISP's U.S.-based upstream ISP to cut off that ISP (or even the entire jurisdiction, depending on the situation) for DMCA violations, gambling, etc. Basically, its an issue of how the community would go about dealing with a blackhat ISP.
An initial question is how closely do backbone providers/upstream ISPs look at offshore ISPs to begin with? What kind of identification/credentials does an ISP need to come up with to get a contract? Specifically, do backbone providers figure out who the beneficial owner of an ISP is before they hook up the ISP? If someone pays the bills regularly, do they need anything more than what's in whois.arin.net?
The next set of questions deal with how long a blackhat ISP could stay connected. Under what circumstances would an upstream ISP/backbone provider cut off the offshore ISP before a court order? What are the choices in the market for backbone providers that are not U.S.-based (and therefore wouldn't be subject to U.S. legal process)?
Free, encrypted, secure Web-based email at www.hushmail.com
On Mon, 2 Jul 2001, Daniel Golding wrote:
"blackhat" seems a strong term for an ISP that wishes to operate without government interference.
("hats" are for hackers. I don't think you'll find many folks who wear such figurative headgear on NANOG)
Some black hats illustrated here: http://www.dotcomeon.com/blackholed.html --Mitch NetSide
Mitch, I got some fertlizer here...from real horses! -C On Mon, Jul 02, 2001 at 10:41:56AM -0400, Mitch Halmu wrote:
On Mon, 2 Jul 2001, Daniel Golding wrote:
"blackhat" seems a strong term for an ISP that wishes to operate without government interference.
("hats" are for hackers. I don't think you'll find many folks who wear such figurative headgear on NANOG)
Some black hats illustrated here:
http://www.dotcomeon.com/blackholed.html
--Mitch NetSide
-- --------------------------- Christopher A. Woodfield rekoil@semihuman.com PGP Public Key: http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xB887618B
On Mon, 2 Jul 2001, Mitch Halmu wrote:
On Mon, 2 Jul 2001, Daniel Golding wrote:
"blackhat" seems a strong term for an ISP that wishes to operate without government interference.
("hats" are for hackers. I don't think you'll find many folks who wear such figurative headgear on NANOG)
Some black hats illustrated here:
I think this url better illustrates the pointed "dunce" hat. Don Vixie? Eh? MIB? Black Helicopters? My apologies for wasting everyones bandwidth with my lack of self-discipline. -Matt
On Mon, Jul 02, 2001 at 10:41:56AM -0400, Mitch Halmu wrote:
Some black hats illustrated here:
Thanks for directing our attention to a photograph of some Men In Black Hats; the operational benefit is immense. But in the context we're talking about, the New Hacker's Dictionary[1] tells us that a "black hat" is: "[common among security specialists] A cracker, someone bent on breaking into the system you are protecting. Oppose the less common `white hat' for an ally or friendly security specialist; the term `gray hat' is in occasional use for people with cracker skills operating within the law, e.g. in doing security evaluations. All three terms derive from the dress code of formulaic Westerns, in which bad guys wore black hats and good guys white ones." The maintainers of MAPS RSS[2] and pals aren't interested in breaking into your mail server. Rather, their goal is to protect others _from_ you, as you've chosen to be irresponsible and consciously operate an open e-mail relay. The problem can be resolved by you fixing your mail server. Personally, I'd get by just fine without e-mail from a nice chunk of the folks listed on your page. -adam [1] <http://www.tuxedo.org/~esr/jargon/jargon.html> [2] <http://mail-abuse.org/rss/>
participants (6)
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Adam Rothschild -
Christopher A. Woodfield -
Daniel Golding -
ethanprestonï¼ hushmail.com -
Matt Wilbur -
Mitch Halmu