On Oct 29, Phil Lawlor <phil@agis.net> wrote:

AGIS is kicking this, along with other ideas around. We spent a great deal of resources on the IEMMC thing, and that didn't work out well. Thought I'd toss the caller ID idea out to get feedback from this list.

I have to applaud you for this -- lots of folks didn't think the IEMMC thing would work (for exactly the same reasons that it failed, interestingly enough), but unfortunately there was no open channel of communication with y'all at that time. If there's interest, I'd be happy to start up a mailing list for backbone types to discuss this stuff, since there's likely to be some debate as to whether it's on-topic for this list. ********************************************************* J.D. Falk voice: +1-650-482-2840 Supervisor, Network Operations fax: +1-650-482-2844 PRIORI NETWORKS, INC. http://www.priori.net "The People You Know. The People You Trust." *********************************************************

[ On Wed, October 29, 1997 at 18:00:15 (-0500), Phil Lawlor wrote: ]

Subject: Re: Tracking SPAM (Re: Spam Control Considered Harmful)

AGIS is kicking this, along with other ideas around. We spent a great deal of resources on the IEMMC thing, and that didn't work out well. Thought I'd toss the caller ID idea out to get feedback from this list.

I think you're partly on the right track. However there's another very critical part of the picture that I've not yet seen clear mention of: i.e. the concurrent implementation of limits to SMTP server connectivity which must go hand in hand with audit trails that can be used to clearly identify the originator and follow him through all e-mail transactions until they completely leave the home ISPs network. I.e. not only must connection origination information be logged, so must all mail transactions originated by customers be captured and logged. Without forcing the mail sender to go through an auditable SMTP transaction with a mailer that the ISP controls with 100% certainty then one cannot be certain to be able to identify the would-be spammer due to missing links in the audit trail. Such controls can obviously be implemented just as easily as the anti-ip-spoofing filters that all ISPs should already be implementing. I and a growing number of other people who've decided to fight spam have been telling ISPs this is the only sure way to control the extremely high and growing amount of third-party illegal relay abuse. (I might note that such abuse has skyrocketed since the decline of the IEMMC.) Unfortunately this puts a burden on ISPs that I'm not certain they are quite ready or able to handle yet. Indeed I've heard relativley little back from the constant stream of requests I send for implementation of such controls with accompanying complaints about third-party abuse originating from throw-away dial-up accounts. Of course once a more substantial contract has been forged between an ISP and a user (i.e. one that enforces an AUP and allows the ISP some degree of certainty that they will be able to extract retribution for breach of contract) then, and only then, might the ISP allow the customer to bypass some of the auditing mechanisms under the assumption (backed up by contract) that the customer will have in place their own similar auditing mechanisms. -- Greg A. Woods +1 416 443-1734 VE3TCP <gwoods@acm.org> <robohack!woods> Planix, Inc. <woods@planix.com>; Secrets of the Weird <woods@weird.com>