Re: A Deep Dive on the Recent Widespread DNS Hijacking
On Feb 25, 2019, at 5:20 AM, Bill Woodcock <woody@pch.net> wrote:
We know that neither Comodo nor Let's Encrypt were DNSSEC validating before issuing certs.
I’d like to clarify that Let’s Encrypt has always validated DNSSEC, dating to before we issued our first publicly trusted certificate in September 2015. -- James Renken (pronouns: he/him) Internet Security Research Group Let's Encrypt: A Free, Automated, and Open CA
On Feb 26, 2019, at 1:34 PM, James Renken via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> wrote:
On Feb 25, 2019, at 5:20 AM, Bill Woodcock <woody@pch.net> wrote:
We know that neither Comodo nor Let's Encrypt were DNSSEC validating before issuing certs.
I’d like to clarify that Let’s Encrypt has always validated DNSSEC, dating to before we issued our first publicly trusted certificate in September 2015.
Yes, my apologies… Comodo may well have been used in the attack against us _because_ Let’s Encrypt was DNSSEC validating. I’m sorry for tarring both Let’s Encrypt and Comodo with the same brush. The fact remains, however, that both Let’s Encrypt and Comodo are facilitating these hijacks by issuing illegitimate certificates to attackers. So, ipso facto, both organizations’ security practices are insufficient. We had what I thought to be a productive call with Jacob Hoffman-Andrews, of Let’s Encrypt, late last week, and arrived at a couple of possibilities for improving the situation a bit, but I don’t imagine that PCH has the expertise to contribute substantively to CA business process improvements, as that’s well outside our field. -Bill
participants (2)
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Bill Woodcock -
James Renken