Violation of Acceptable Use Policies
Almost every major Internet provider's acceptable use policy prohibits the sending of unsolicited bulk e-mail. ISPs have been encouraged to terminate the accounts of people who engage in the sending of unsolicited bulk e-mail. Several third-party groups maintain RBL's of groups which send unsolicited bulk e-mail. http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/01/11/sproject.irq.email/index.html Which ISP gets to tell the US Military their connection is being pulled because Iraq complained about unsolicited bulk e-mail?
On Sat, 11 Jan 2003, Sean Donelan wrote:
Which ISP gets to tell the US Military their connection is being pulled because Iraq complained about unsolicited bulk e-mail?
I'll be more interested in seeing what the military does when people start mass spamming US military addresses (doesn't every us soldier/sailor/airman have an email address? I seem to remmeber that they do for contact with relatives). It would be pretty easy for someone to pay a spammer (probably outside the US) to mail a million US military addresses with interesting stuff on US foreign policy, warcrimes regulations and zionist conspiricies. Even the URLs for a few mainstream European newspapaers' websites might be useful. Not to mention the "Anthrax in NYC, News blackout" type of chain letter spreading panic. I thought the US tried to avoid using tactics which it was more vulnerable to? This was originally why there was a ban on assassinations. ObOperational: Does anyone have a pointer to "war footing" practices? Things like gaving prepared links to News websites, reduced maintenance, rumor control and the like? BTW: New Zealand does have soldiers fighting in Afganistan and had peace keepers in East Timor so that chances of us being directly targetted (NZers were killed in a Bali bombing) are good. -- Simon Lyall. | Newsmaster | Work: simon.lyall@ihug.co.nz Senior Network/System Admin | Postmaster | Home: simon@darkmere.gen.nz ihug, Auckland, NZ | Asst Doorman | Web: http://www.darkmere.gen.nz
On Sun, 12 Jan 2003, Simon Lyall wrote:
ObOperational: Does anyone have a pointer to "war footing" practices? Things like gaving prepared links to News websites, reduced maintenance, rumor control and the like?
As reported at the Sprint 2002 NANOG I was the working group lead for the ISP disaster recovery working group. We prepared a document on steps ISPs should take in preparation for a disaster, but its not generally available. However, the paper really didn't contain any surprises. Around the world ISPs have learned how to operate in the middle of wars and unrest over the last 10 years. B92 in the former Yugoslavia was one of the more vocal ISPs operating during a military conflict. EUnet and other ISPs were also active through much of the conflict. There are several other continuing conflicts around the world which don't reach the level of full scale military action. One of the few publically available documents about operating a public network during a disaster is ANSI T1.202-1998 Internetwork Operations Guidelines for Network Management of the Public Switched Networks under Disaster Conditions These guidelines encompass the cooperative intercompany network management actions (that may be) required during emergency conditions associated with disasters that threaten life or property and cause congestion in the public switched networks (PSNs). Network management actions should optimize the integrity of the PSNs while obtaining the maximum use of the network capability during a disaster condition. These guidelines address the network actions required to relieve congestion in the PSN caused by failures resulting from the disaster conditions. Examples of disaster conditions that would benefit from these guidelines are: natural disasters (such as hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and the like), major accidents (such as transportation, industrial, or environmental), or civil disturbances (such as terrorist acts or other similar events).
On Tue, 14 Jan 2003, Sean Donelan wrote: :Around the world ISPs have learned how to operate in the middle of wars :and unrest over the last 10 years. B92 in the former Yugoslavia was one :of the more vocal ISPs operating during a military conflict. Not to nitpick, but the entire B92 AS disappeared off the network for the duration of the conflict about 2-3 weeks before the ceasefire. Weren't they disconnected on order of the police? (If memory serves). :EUnet and :other ISPs were also active through much of the conflict. There are :several other continuing conflicts around the world which don't reach the :level of full scale military action. It's hard to tell how well they stood up, most notably Beotel. We (Will Waites and I) watched for route withdrawals from AS's registered in the Belgrade area, and due to aggregation, it was very difficult to tell whether any of them were actually reachable using BGP information alone. The one notable change we saw was the withdrawal of all of B92's routes and didn't see them come back up, though we stopped moniting when the bombing stopped, as we were just trying to corelate route withdrawals and CNN bombing reports. So, from what we saw the Internet fared fairly well in Belgrade, however, without IGP information, or pings of actual hosts, this is still up for debate. -- batz
On Tue, 14 Jan 2003, batz wrote:
Not to nitpick, but the entire B92 AS disappeared off the network for the duration of the conflict about 2-3 weeks before the ceasefire. Weren't they disconnected on order of the police? (If memory serves).
They were up and down a few times, but mostly they were very vocal. They weren't a facilities based provider, so when the PTT shut off their circuit they seemed to pop back up somewhere else several times.
So, from what we saw the Internet fared fairly well in Belgrade, however, without IGP information, or pings of actual hosts, this is still up for debate.
Cheswick had some more data showing networks going offline througout the conflict. What was interesting wasn't networks went down. But how quickly people were able to use whatever facilities which were still working to bring up some service. Satellite, fiber, copper, dial, etc.
Which ISP gets to tell the US Military their connection is being pulled because Iraq complained about unsolicited bulk e-mail?
Genuity? :) traceroute to www.defenselink.mil (131.84.1.60), 30 hops max, 40 byte packets <snip> 15 p2-0.vienna1-nbr2.bbnplanet.net (4.24.4.214) [AS1] 12 ms 13 ms 17 ms 16 p1-0.vienna1-cr7.bbnplanet.net (4.0.2.146) [AS1] 18 ms 13 ms 12 ms 17 * * * 18 * * *
Jeffrey Meltzer wrote:
Genuity? :)
traceroute to www.defenselink.mil (131.84.1.60), 30 hops max, 40 byte packets
<snip> 15 p2-0.vienna1-nbr2.bbnplanet.net (4.24.4.214) [AS1] 12 ms 13 ms 17 ms 16 p1-0.vienna1-cr7.bbnplanet.net (4.0.2.146) [AS1] 18 ms 13 ms 12 ms 17 * * * 18 * * *
Perhaps you need to "improve" your traceroute? ;-) FFT: Tracing route to www.defenselink.mil Hop FFT trace to dod.gov (131.84.1.60): 1 ln-gateway.centergate.com (206.117.161.1) 127.7ms 2 isi-acg.ln.net (130.152.136.1) 187.0ms 3 isi-1-lngw2-pos.ln.net (130.152.80.30) 2.2ms 4 ge-2-3-0.a02.lsanca02.us.ra.verio.net (198.172.117.161) 2.8/*ms 5 xe-1-0-0.r21.lsanca01.us.bb.verio.net (129.250.29.136) 3.0ms 6 p16-1-1-0.r21.snjsca04.us.bb.verio.net (129.250.2.187) 11.1ms 7 p16-1-1-2.r21.plalca01.us.bb.verio.net (129.250.2.198) 11.6ms 8 p16-1-0-0.r00.plalca01.us.bb.verio.net (129.250.3.85) 11.5ms 9 p4-0.uunet.plalca01.us.bb.verio.net (129.250.9.98) 16.6ms 10 0.so-2-0-0.XL1.SAC1.ALTER.NET (152.63.52.250) 16.5ms 11 0.so-3-0-0.TL1.SAC1.ALTER.NET (152.63.53.250) 16.3ms 12 0.so-1-1-0.TL1.DCA6.ALTER.NET (152.63.1.117) 93.6ms 13 0.so-2-2-0.XL1.DCA8.ALTER.NET (152.63.41.137) 93.5ms 14 POS6-0.GW2.DCA8.ALTER.NET (152.63.39.173) 93.4ms ** [neglected] no reply packets received from TTLs 15 through 16 17 [target] dod.gov (131.84.1.60):80 94.7ms FFT's trace took 13.67 seconds. Resolution required 0.53 seconds. -- Rodney Joffe CenterGate Research Group, LLC. http://www.centergate.com "Technology so advanced, even we don't understand it!"(R)
Rodney Joffe wrote:
16 p1-0.vienna1-cr7.bbnplanet.net (4.0.2.146) [AS1] 18 ms 13 ms 12 ms ^^^^^^^^^
Perhaps you need to "improve" your traceroute? ;-)
14 POS6-0.GW2.DCA8.ALTER.NET (152.63.39.173) 93.4ms ^^^^^ Doh. Sorry. Failed to pay attention. Must try harder.
Oddly enough, from Oregon route-views: BGP routing table entry for 131.84.0.0/16, version 26724 Paths: (50 available, best #41) Not advertised to any peer 267 2914 1 140 204.42.253.253 from 204.42.253.253 (204.42.253.253) Origin IGP, metric 2, localpref 100, valid, external Community: 267:2914 2914:420 2914:2000 2914:3000 4513 701 140 195.66.224.82 from 195.66.224.82 (209.10.12.222) Origin IGP, metric 23302, localpref 100, valid, external 8297 6453 701 140 195.219.96.239 from 195.219.96.239 (195.219.96.239) Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external 3257 1 140 213.200.87.254 from 213.200.87.254 (213.200.87.40) Origin IGP, metric 910, localpref 100, valid, external 9942 1 140 203.194.0.5 from 203.194.0.5 (203.194.0.5) Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external Community: 9942:120 9942:204 9942:8060 16150 8434 3257 1 140 217.75.96.60 from 217.75.96.60 (217.75.96.60) Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external -- Rodney Joffe CenterGate Research Group, LLC. http://www.centergate.com "Technology so advanced, even we don't understand it!"(R)
participants (5)
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batz -
Jeffrey Meltzer -
Rodney Joffe -
Sean Donelan -
Simon Lyall