re: >One interesting thing I found during my research since September 11 is the Internet held up well because of its extensive use of alternate providers. < Lest we forget, there were considerable problems bringing certain IXs back on line that were in the affected zone back on line for a over a week after the day of the attacks, due to problems assoicated with on-site power generation. But ignoring those exceptions... ... yes, the Internet held up nicely, like you say, but for many reasons, including its use of alternate providers. Another reason, if we're to look at this in a comparative sense (which I've inferred is the case), that is, how the 'Net fared versus how 140 West Street did, was because none of the Internet's main exchanges or hubs took direct hits. ISPs and NSPs were spared a tremendous amount of grief, imo, but only as a result of serendipitous consequences, because the Twin Towers were NOT located just a couple of blocks closer to 60 Hudson Street. Even as it was, there was ongoing speculation that structural damage did exist at 60 Hudson, but fortunately those were _only_ speculations, as it turns out (and as far as I know). But had the towers been an 8th of a mile closer to 60 Hudson things would have turned out far differently for the 'Net, not only domestically, but internationally as well. Has anyone assessed the level of risk that exists to the 'Net due to the high levels of traffic concentration at 60 Hudson. Or, 1 Wilshire in LA, for that matter? Curious. -FAC
Tommorrow's edition (Oct 19) of the Wall Street Journal has yet another article about Verizon's 140 West Street office.
"Others say the extensive damage to Verizon's hub demonstrated that it is dangerous to rely on one company. They point out that only with the help of smaller competitors did parts of New York get their dial tones back.
"We have buildings that would have been waiting for Verizon to get the service up if there were not alternatives," says Agostino Cangemi, the New York City commissioner in charge of telecom franchising
One interesting thing I found during my research since September 11 is the Internet held up well because of its extensive use of alternate providers. Verizon tends to be very expensive, so ISPs needing lots of "cheap" bandwidth purchased service from a variety of competitors. Much of this was not planned, nor did ISPs have a clue where their circuits ran. It just happened due to Adam Smith's invisible hand.
That's not to say CLECs didn't have problems. AT&T/TCG was walloped hard, and several ISPs have essentially abandoned some TCG facilities because they won't be repaired for a long time. MFN lost a huge amount of fiber. Worldcom won't say how bad MFS/Brooks/etc was hit but Worldcom customers report their circuits were out for 3-4 weeks and may not be repaired until the end of the year.
On Sat, 20 Oct 2001, Frank Coluccio wrote:
Lest we forget, there were considerable problems bringing certain IXs back on line that were in the affected zone back on line for a over a week after the day of the attacks, due to problems assoicated with on-site power generation. But ignoring those exceptions...
I remember them, and included them in my NANOG presentation. But if you compare the NYSE restoration (with the full faith, credit and Presidential order) versus no-name carrier hotel restoration things aren't straightforward. Even with the diversion of Verizon's resources to the NYSE, the carrier hotels got back on-line darn quick. I mapped out all the CLEC facilities I know about in lower manhattan. Some are very close to the WTC complex, others are far away. Some were damaged, some weren't. That's the point of diversity. A couple of CLECs suffered damage even worse than Verizon. One CLEC's POP is gone. It was pretty much luck of the draw what was damaged. The damage isn't a reflection on the quality of any provider. But if I'm a network manager, my concern isn't assessing blame but getting my network back online as quick as possible. What is the best assurance I can get my network online (assuming my own building wasn't destroyed)? The best bet seems to be buildings with multiple carriers.
Has anyone assessed the level of risk that exists to the 'Net due to the high levels of traffic concentration at 60 Hudson. Or, 1 Wilshire in LA, for that matter? Curious.
As Yogi Berra said, "Nobody goes there anymore; it's too crowded." Honestly, the data doesn't exist, so if anyone claims they have its just a wild guess. Given that, here is a wild guess. Historically, based upon previous accidents and failures of major exchange points, failures of "national" exchange points cause the least problems. The loss of one or two national exchange points (there has been a dual failure in the past) caused lots of traffic on NANOG. But the traffic kept flowing. National exchange points tend to be bright, shiny beacons. Everyone is (or should be) aware of the risk and engineer their network with that knowledge. Operator error and software bugs still cause the worst problems. The worst physical failures have been in locations where no one realized the risk existed.
participants (2)
-
Frank Coluccio
-
Sean Donelan