Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"
----- Forwarded message from "Jeffrey I. Schiller" <jis@mit.edu> ----- Date: Sat, 7 Sep 2013 19:52:44 -0400 From: "Jeffrey I. Schiller" <jis@mit.edu> To: Gregory Perry <Gregory.Perry@govirtual.tv> Cc: "cryptography@metzdowd.com" <cryptography@metzdowd.com>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>, ianG <iang@iang.org> Subject: Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Sat, Sep 07, 2013 at 09:14:47PM +0000, Gregory Perry wrote:
And this is exactly why there is no real security on the Internet. Because the IETF and standards committees and working groups are all in reality political fiefdoms and technological monopolies aimed at lining the pockets of a select few companies deemed "worthy" of authenticating user documentation for purposes of establishing online credibility. ... Encrypting IPv6 was initially a mandatory part of the spec, but then it somehow became discretionary. The nuts and bolts of strong crypto have been around for decades, but the IETF and related standards "powers to be" are more interested in creating a global police state than guaranteeing some semblance of confidential and privacy for Internet users.
I’m sorry, but I cannot let this go unchallenged. I was there, I saw it. For those who don’t know, I was the IESG Security Area Director from 1994 - 2003. (by myself until 1998 after which we had two co-AD’s in the Security Area). During this timeframe we formed the TLS working group, the PGP working group and IPv6 became a Draft Standard. Scott Bradner and I decided that security should be mandatory in IPv6, in the hope that we could drive more adoption. The IETF was (and probably still is) a bunch of hard working individuals who strive to create useful technology for the Internet. In particular IETF contributors are in theory individual contributors and not representatives of their employers. Of course this is the theory and practice is a bit “noisier” but the bulk of participant I worked with were honest hard working individuals. Security fails on the Internet for three important reasons, that have nothing to do with the IETF or the technology per-se (except for point 3). 1. There is little market for “the good stuff”. When people see that they have to provide a password to login, they figure they are safe... In general the consuming public cannot tell the difference between “good stuff” and snake oil. So when presented with a $100 “good” solution or a $10 bunch of snake oil, guess what gets bought. 2. Security is *hard*, it is a negative deliverable. You do not know when you have it, you only know when you have lost it (via compromise). It is therefore hard to show return on investment with security. It is hard to assign a value to something not happening. 2a. Most people don’t really care until they have been personally bitten. A lot of people only purchase a burglar alarm after they have been burglarized. Although people are more security aware today, that is a relatively recent development. 3. As engineers we have totally and completely failed to deliver products that people can use. I point out e-mail encryption as a key example. With today’s solutions you need to understand PK and PKI at some level in order to use it. That is likely requiring a driver to understand the internal combustion engine before they can drive their car. The real world doesn’t work that way. No government conspiracy required. We have seen the enemy and it is... -Jeff _______________________________________________________________________ Jeffrey I. Schiller Information Services and Technology Massachusetts Institute of Technology 77 Massachusetts Avenue Room E17-110A, 32-392 Cambridge, MA 02139-4307 617.910.0259 - Voice jis@mit.edu http://jis.qyv.name _______________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFSK7xM8CBzV/QUlSsRApyUAKCB6GpP/hUHxtOQNGjSB5FDZS8hFACfVec6 pPw4Xvukq3OqPEkmVZKl0c8= =9/UP -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5
On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 9:07 AM, Eugen Leitl <eugen@leitl.org> wrote:
1. [...] In general the consuming public cannot tell the difference between “good stuff” and snake oil. So when presented with a $100 “good” solution or a $10 bunch of snake oil, guess what gets bought.
Or there might be 2 good solutions for certain security functions around $100. And 10 different flavors of $90 snake oil,and plenty of $50, $100, and $120 snake oil flavors. The world is full of salespeople and marketers; and the snakeoil salespersons are just as great as the "good stuff" salespeople ---- also, with more resources to devote to sales, than engineering; the snakeoil salespersons have more time and resources available to look at their competitors' merchandising, and make the snakeoil bottles on the store shelves are the ones that look the most appealing to the potential buyers. A wary buyer should not believe the salesperson, but demand a thorough long-term critical review (a 30 day demo of some product is not sufficient duration to discover that it's totally bunk). 2. Security is *hard*, it is a negative deliverable. You do not know
when you have it, you only know when you have lost it (via compromise). It is therefore hard to show return on investment with security. It is hard to assign a value to something not happening.
This is because it doesn't make sense to say that security itself has a ROI in the first place. IT security is risk management --- therefore, in isolation security means nothing: security is a way of mitigating fundamental risks that are improbable events that are nevertheless certain to happen eventually (given enough time) that have an average negative ROI. There is a fundamental tradeoff between risk and return: If you spend NO money on security, lawyers, to help structure the business to avoid liabilities, and other protections such as insurance then you INCREASE return; in the short term, you will most likely have much greater profit, if you don't bother with any insurance, lawyers, or security. It all works fine, until there is a disaster, someone files a lawsuit, or you have a breakin. For example: by not purchasing insurance on your business assets; you avoid spending insurance premium dollars. This increases how much money you make (your return), as long as nothing bad happens. However, not buying insurance, or not paying the costs of security greatly increase the risk that the business incurs a loss because something bad happens. Furthermore, spending a lot of money on security reduces return, BUT also reduces the risk. Security does not have a ROI, but it does have a tradeoff. That tradeoff should be understood using the language of risk management, not profit/loss. And there is no reason people can't understand that.... after all; they do understand, what happens if you don't pay lawyers to help your enterprises comply with the law, or draft successfully binding contracts. You should expect to spend amounts on security per year, commensurate with the costs of insuring those data assets against the liability that would be incurred if they were tampered with or leaked to the public; granted, plenty of orgs are much more likely to have an internet-based security breach than a fire or a flood, therefore, the risk you take on by not spending on security is possibly a larger risk. 2a. Most people don’t really care until they have been personally
bitten. A lot of people only purchase a burglar alarm after they have been burglarized.
Most people purchase homeowners' insurance. Vehicle insurance is mandated by the state in many cases. I wonder if someday; a similar per-PC mandatory purchase will someday be required for computer security.
3. As engineers we have totally and completely failed to deliver products that people can use. I point out e-mail encryption as a key example. With today’s solutions you need to understand PK and PKI at some level in order to use it. That is likely requiring a driver to understand the internal combustion engine before they can drive their car. The real world doesn’t work that way.
Yes. This is a total nightmare. Before Joe consumer can send an encrypted mail; he has to either go to some command line and gpg --gen-key or go to Xyz CA corporation, buy a personal SSL certificate for some expensive per-year premium $10 or more... and then go through a lot of trouble to figure out how to import that into the browser, and manually repeat this process every 1 to 3 years that his certificate expires; the process Joe has to go through to S/MIME enable every copy of his mail client on all his different computers, and his webmail provider, is even more complicated. Before anyone can send Joe an encrypted message; Joe somehow has to get all his correspondents to manually import a copy of his certificate. This is clearly miles outside the realm of possibility for the average Windows user.
-Jeff
-- -JH
With regards to the 10$ snake oil security product versus the real one at $100: since the NSA can break both, they are both worth worth $0 in terms of privacy.
From a business/corporate point of view, there are two aspects:
1- Image: If your weak security has allowed a data breach to become public (such as TJ-Maxx) then you have damage to your image. But TJ-Maxx has survived and average person forgot about millions of credit card numbers having been stolen from its databases. If the NSA snoops on your systems to see what kind of underwear Ossama Bin Ladin buys and where he has them delivered, there is nothing your company can do about it. Either you don't know it is happening and NSA will never make it public (no image problem), or you got a warrant and were forced to do it (some image problem, but you can say your hands were tied and shift blame to NSA) 2- Real cost: if you're a bank, and someone intercepts a letter of credit or payment transaction to find out how much a corporate customer pays for widgets, that customer can sue you for breach of security/confidentiality (since its competitors now know what deal he has negotiated to buy those widgets). The lawsuit against the bank has real costs (not only lawyers, but settlement as well). It becomes easier to cost justify security when you can put real costs to not having security. So risk management is an important factor in both cases. BUT, when you get to general public, the equation changes: For the general public, a burglary is a good analogy. You can easily put value to the stolen TV set and replace it. But this isn't what happens when the NSA spies on your private communications and you have no real measurable damage. The damage you get is akin to losing your family pictures or the feeling of having been violated because someone came into your home and rummage through all your personal stuff and not knowing exactly what they will do with your personal items and why they stole them. Putting a value to this is next to impossible. Risk managememnt becomes impossible, except at the politival level. If the NSA intercepts private emails between a husband and his mistress, the husband can't know if the NSA will ever use this against him. This fear remains because the NSA night hold on to these emails for a long time (or might not). And at the political level, Obama made it clear in a recent speech that he hopes this will blow over and that he will be able to convince americans that the NSA is doing good things. Their political staffers evaluated the risk that this might backfire and figured it wouldn't. This has nothing to do with selection of technology to guard against the NSA' it is all about political public opinion. Here is what the politicians forget: Because the economy is moving to the internet, losing trust in the internet is akin to losing trust in the banking system. I am not sure network operators have much of a choice. Sure, someone like Bell Canada will hopefully review their no-peering policy in Canada (forcing so much traffic to route via USA), but for other networks there isn't much they can do to prevent NSA from accessing any/all data while in transit. What is really needed is for an intelligent debate by politicians on the need to preserve trust in the internet and whether preventing a couple of bombs is really worth the loss of trust and freedom due to implementation of measures worse than what "1984" predicted. Since intelligent debate by politicians is impossible, the other way to change things is to seriously deprive any politician who supports excessive spying by NSA of any money and chance to be re-elected. Imagine the good publicity AT&T and/or Verizon would get if they were to announce that they are ceasing all political contributions to any party or individual politician who supports the indiscriminate data collection done by NSA. And this might be enough to tilt the table and get politicians to start to criticise the NSA and call for measures to limit its spying.
On Sun, Sep 08, 2013 at 03:50:33PM -0400, Jean-Francois Mezei wrote:
Here is what the politicians forget: Because the economy is moving to the internet, losing trust in the internet is akin to losing trust in the banking system.
If the last five years have left anyone with a shred of trust in the banking system, then the Internet is in no danger of becoming untrusted due to the recent revelations. - Matt
participants (4)
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Eugen Leitl
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Jean-Francois Mezei
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Jimmy Hess
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Matt Palmer