In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can. Inferred improvements during Feb 2022: ASN Name Fixed-By 26554 US-SIGNAL 2022-02-01 32440 LONI 2022-02-09 19230 NANOG 2022-02-17 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Feb 2022: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 54825 PACKET 2016-04-15 2022-02-26 19230 NANOG 2016-06-13 2022-02-17 209 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST 2016-08-16 2022-02-24 20412 CLARITY-TELECOM 2016-09-30 2022-02-26 6181 FUSE-NET 2016-10-10 2022-02-28 22898 ATLINK 2016-12-16 2022-02-27 63296 AWBROADBAND 2017-09-01 2022-02-22 33452 RW 2018-09-19 2022-02-26 5078 ONENET-AS-1 2020-04-06 2022-02-05 398836 NP-NETWORKS 2021-03-12 2022-02-25 56207 Converge 2021-03-26 2022-02-20 22191 WILKES-COMM 2021-06-25 2022-02-24 63457 EMPIRE-CONNECT 2021-09-08 2022-02-24 212934 AS_POTVIN 2021-10-03 2022-02-28 22773 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC 2021-10-24 2022-02-23 394437 PSLIGHTWAVE 2021-12-02 2022-02-24 62887 WHITESKY-COMMUNICATIONS 2021-12-03 2022-02-02 54201 WEWORK-MANAGEMENT-LLC 2021-12-16 2022-02-25 7896 NU 2022-01-12 2022-02-24 396919 BLADE-GLOBAL 2022-01-16 2022-02-24 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=usa,can&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info@caida.org