Thus, removing a certificate or ROA *does NOT* result in an RPKI INVALID route announcement; the result is RPKI UNKNOWN.

Which is fine until UNKNOWNs are no longer permitted, a logical next step. It may not apply globally, initially perhaps just a US anti terrorist measure requiring all networks in the USA do it.

The only way a court order could make a route announcement get the RPKI status *INVALID* would be to: 1: Remove the original, legitimate ROA 2: Tamper with the Registry, inject a false ROA authorizing another AS to make the announcement look like a hijack

Domains already get FBI hijacked so this seems plausible too.

All in all, for an RPKI-specific court order to be effective in taking a network offline, the RIR would have to tamper with the registry, inject false data and try to make sure it's not detected so nobody applies a local override.

Doesn't need to be undetected, more likely it'll be quite overt and have a big don't mess FBI entry in the RIR similar to www.megaupload.com brandon