It's route table pollution if you ask me.. in today's world we have many IXPs and several tier-1 operators that support RPKI ROV, so when you have issued ROAs for the supernet of the IP space in question it'll already significantly reduce the effects of a BGP hijack. Best regards, Martijn On 8/9/21 5:47 PM, Billy Croan wrote:
How does the community feel about using /24 originations in BGP as a tactical advantage against potential bgp hijackers?
All of our allocations are larger and those prefixes we announce for clients as well usually are. But we had a request recently to originate everything as distinct /24 prefixes, to reduce the effect of a potential bgp hijack. It seemed a little bit like a tragedy of the commons situation.
Is this seen as route table pollution, or a necessary evil in today's world? How many routers out there today would be affected if everyone did this? Are there any big networks that drop or penalize announcements like this?