On Thu, 31 May 2001, Andrew Dorsett wrote:
I'm going to reply to my own post here. I am thoroughly impressed. I sent the message out and in 10 minutes I had two replies. Keep the ideas coming, I will form up a general suggestion message and post it later. One thing to think about, I want a way to do it without having to call a NOC like Genuity and asking them to put in a filter, I want a way to do something about it at a lower level.
If you think about what you're asking for means operationally, what you want is the ability to get your upstream to allow you to install filters on their routers... That requires a great of deal trust, which is not likely to be forthcoming in the current evironment.
Like multiple connections....Remember NOC calls take time because of hold times... Someone just told me (on here) that the IETF is working on something,
That was Jared
anyone know how many more years it will take for that protocol?
One of the obersevations I would make up you original question is that dos attacks do not in this day and age typically originate in core networks but rather on tens or hundreds or thousands of edge network devices... your upstream is unlikely to have a good handle on the actual source of the attack (which in any case may be several locations) rather it's far more easy to characterize the target (you) and filter on that.
Thanks again, Andrew
At 05:59 PM 5/31/2001, you wrote:
Hey, this is a technical question for all of the Network Engineers/Architects on the list. Has a method been found to stop an incoming attack? Granted you can filter the packets to null on the router, but that doesn't stop them from coming across the wire and into the router. Has a way been devised to stop them from coming into the router; via something like a BGP update to null the packets or what? I'm concerned about a flood that is so massive coming from the core and flooding a small T1 or less.
Thanks, Andrew --- <zerocool@netpath.net> http://www.andrewsworld.net/ ICQ: 2895251 Cisco Certified Network Associate Development Assistant: Netpath/Stratonet, Inc. (http://www.netpath.net/) Email: dorsett@netpath.net
"Learn from the mistakes of others. You won't live long enough to make all of them yourself." -- Unknown "YEEEHA!!! What a CRASH!!!" -- Random System Administrator
--- <zerocool@netpath.net> http://www.andrewsworld.net/ ICQ: 2895251 Cisco Certified Network Associate Development Assistant: Netpath/Stratonet, Inc. (http://www.netpath.net/) Email: dorsett@netpath.net
"Learn from the mistakes of others. You won't live long enough to make all of them yourself." -- Unknown "YEEEHA!!! What a CRASH!!!" -- Random System Administrator
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