Martijn Schmidt via NANOG wrote:
Given that there is (or should be) an unbroken chain of contracts and payments from IANA to RIR (to NIR) to LIR and beyond for all non-legacy resources, I'd say they are in a pretty good position to take care of the due diligence work to validate an organisation's ownership as well as its associated resources and subsequently publish the result through a cryptographic signature. If one of the RIRs or NIRs is not doing that job properly then we should (at first privately) call them out on it and push them to improve.
I'm afraid that improvement is very hard, given the reality of fraud involving intra-national real estate registration as is exemplified by: https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/legal-options-available-to-victims-of-real... Real estate fraud in Ontario generally includes "mortgage fraud" (e.g. fraudsters acquire a mortgage fraudulently through false information or identification and run away with the money, leaving the true home owners with a significant liability) and "title fraud" (e.g. fraudsters use stolen identity or forged documents to transfer a registered owner's title to him or herself without the owner's knowledge). How can a real estate or IP address registrar detect "forged documents to transfer a registered owner's title to him or herself without the owner's knowledge", especially when the transfer is international? Also, though I think existing code is applicable to fraud involving IP addresses, its practical applicability for international cases is questionable. Masataka Ohta