Kind of interesting to consider how a successful implementation of RPKI might change the rules of this game we all play in. I tried talking about that at ARIN in Toronto, not certain I was clear enough.
first, let's remember that the rpki is a distributed database which has a number of possible applications. the first technical application on the horizon is route origin validation.
I'm not at all convinced this would help all that much. A PKI would allow better verification of authentication - but how many providers currently have doubts about who the other end of their BGP session is? I'm sure most of the ones who care have already set up TCPMD5 and/or TTL hacks, and the rest wouldn't deploy an RPKI.
route origin validation is not about authenticating your neighbor. it is about being able to base your routing policy on whether the origin asn of an announcement is authorized to originate a particular prefix. it is stopping fat fingers such as pk/youtube, 7007, and the every day accidental mis-announcements of others' prefixes. randy