It looks like we've got a nanog mail loop going on here. Haven't seen one of these in quite a while. In any case, I have included the full headers below, and cc'd the relevant postmasters at (apparently) netscape and mcom.com -forrestc@imach.com ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Return-Path: owner-nanog@merit.edu Received: from merit.edu (merit.edu [35.1.1.42]) by IMgate.iMach.com (8.6.12/8.6.12) with ESMTP id VAA20161 for <forrestc@imach.com>; Fri, 23 Aug 1996 21:03:03 -0600 Received: from localhost (daemon@localhost) by merit.edu (8.7.5/merit-2.0) with SMTP id WAA25979; Fri, 23 Aug 1996 22:37:18 -0400 (EDT) Received: by merit.edu (bulk_mailer v1.5); Fri, 23 Aug 1996 22:37:15 -0400 Received: (from daemon@localhost) by merit.edu (8.7.5/merit-2.0) id WAA25965 for nanog-outgoing; Fri, 23 Aug 1996 22:37:15 -0400 (EDT) Received: from littlewing.mcom.com (h-205-217-255-33.netscape.com [205.217.255.33]) by merit.edu (8.7.5/merit-2.0) with ESMTP id WAA25960 for <nanog@merit.edu>; Fri, 23 Aug 1996 22:37:12 -0400 (EDT) Received: (from root@localhost) by littlewing.mcom.com (8.7.3/8.7.3) id TAA11467; Fri, 23 Aug 1996 19:39:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: from maleman.mcom.com (maleman.mcom.com [198.93.92.3]) by tera.mcom.com (8.6.12/8.6.9) with ESMTP id WAA10758 for <mcom.list.nanog@tera.mcom.com>; Thu, 22 Aug 1996 22:36:06 -0700 Received: from ns.netscape.com (ns.netscape.com.mcom.com [198.95.251.10]) by maleman.mcom.com (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id WAA05229 for <list-nanog@netscape.com>; Thu, 22 Aug 1996 22:32:52 -0700 Received: from merit.edu (merit.edu [35.1.1.42]) by ns.netscape.com (8.7.3/8.7.3) with ESMTP id WAA27127 for <list-nanog@netscape.com>; Thu, 22 Aug 1996 22:31:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (daemon@localhost) by merit.edu (8.7.5/merit-2.0) with SMTP id BAA02728; Fri, 23 Aug 1996 01:26:26 -0400 (EDT) Received: by merit.edu (bulk_mailer v1.5); Fri, 23 Aug 1996 01:25:34 -0400 Received: (from daemon@localhost) by merit.edu (8.7.5/merit-2.0) id BAA02706 for nanog-outgoing; Fri, 23 Aug 1996 01:25:33 -0400 (EDT) Received: from gw.quake.net (gw.quake.net [140.174.86.11]) by merit.edu (8.7.5/merit-2.0) with ESMTP id BAA02701 for <nanog@merit.edu>; Fri, 23 Aug 1996 01:25:28 -0400 (EDT) Received: from quest.quake.net (avg@l24.ip.Quake.Net [198.68.224.24]) by gw.quake.net (8.7.4/8.7.4) with ESMTP id WAA02853; Thu, 22 Aug 1996 22:24:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: (from avg@localhost) by quest.quake.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) id WAA02453; Thu, 22 Aug 1996 22:22:03 -0700 Date: Thu, 22 Aug 1996 22:22:03 -0700 From: Vadim Antonov <avg@quake.net> Message-Id: <199608230522.WAA02453@quest.quake.net> To: curtis@ans.net, nanog@merit.edu Subject: Re: Access to the Internic Blocked Sender: owner-nanog@merit.edu Curtis Villamizar wrote:
Not at all. LSRR is a nice tool to mount practically untraceable flooding attack (hint -- just forge source address and spread intermediate points evenly across the network). Shutting you down may be exactly what the attacker wants.
Oh come on. Like they're not going to get caught stuffing an entire T1 with LSRR packets. Face it. You're grabbing at straws.
Ugh. To kill multiple DS-3s you don't even need a full T-1 (you need one LS address for every loop), and you can kill multiple DS-3s and an IXP to boot, with the single stream of bogons routed in a loop with many hops. And there's a lot of big name Us with DS-3 connectivity and no security whatsoever. Now, throw in randomized first hop and forged source address, and i'll wish you good luck catching the perpetrator. A careful attacker would also randomize destinations and make it to look like regular TCP traffic. (And did anybody think of IP stacks which reverse the source routes, just to make things funnier).
Besides the fact that with your suggestion of traceroute using ICMP echo requests they'd just send a T1s worth of ICMP echo requests with LSRR and accomplish the same thing.
Ok, with only one intermediate point allowed. _That_ should take care of all diagnostic needs.
LSRR is just too useful for diagnosing network problems to shut down on a backbone.
I sometimes wonder if the threat of hackers is exaggregated. They certainly missed a nice opportunity to crash the Internet with TCP resets on iBGPs. Now nobody cares about the creative potential of LSRR-anonymized denial of service attacks. They must be stupid or something. Should i write a backbone-crasher and post it to USENET just to make a point about LSRRs? Note that a provider which won't shut LSRR will be the threat to others... --vadim --WAA10774.840778792/tera.mcom.com--