On Sun, Aug 21, 2011 at 3:27 AM, Erik Bais <ebais@a2b-internet.com> wrote:
Convenient as it may be to use a LIR and their historic provided prefixes, have you thought about starting with a clean slate ?
It's probably better for the network community if he _doesn't_ let an apparently known hijack to continue; maybe any address hijacker(s) involved will learn a lesson and stop. In the long run it's probably not the most convenient action, the hijack has probably 'tainted' the reputation of the addresses, as in Spamhaus listing[?] The most responsible action would be to try to put a stop to any hijack/unofficial use of the existing prefix, and after the new network requirements are determined, return any portion of the assigned addresses that is no longer immediately justified under the current network design. If info is correctly fixed in WHOIS, then send each of the AS/upstream AS contacts from the announcement a letter from the administrative / tech contact to request that they stop propagating such and such errant announcement from the prefix, as long as rogue announcements continue.... If it continues to be a problem, find the upstreams' upstreams, until you are sending letters to Tier1 operators. Regards, -- -JH