On Sun, 2007-04-01 at 16:42 -0700, Roland Dobbins wrote:
On Apr 1, 2007, at 3:36 PM, Douglas Otis wrote:
By ensuring data published by registry's can be previewed, all registrars would be affected equally.
But what is the probative value of the 'preview'? By what criteria is the reputational quality of the domain assessed, and by whom?
A preview affords time for correlating and pushing protective information to the edge. Some reviewing previews may specialize in look-alike fraud. Others may specialize in net nanny services. Not all exploits will be initially recognized, where a defense in depth should include examining the infrastructure. A preview is required before this infrastructural information can offer the greatest level of protection. Reacting to new domains after the fact is often too late.
It almost seems as if the base problem has to do with credit-card transaction validation and fraud reporting, rather than anything to do with the actual domain registration process?
Until Internet commerce requires some physical proof of identity, fraud will continue. A zone preview approach can reduce related exploits and associated crime, and the amount of information pushed to the edge. -Doug