I thought all responsible parties (like Sprint) filtered their customer routes. I know I can't advertise or leak out anything to MCI or UUNet that I havn't registered with them. I've heard in the past that Sprints route acceptance policy was a little on the trusting side, but not filtering your customers announcements is just silly. They (sprint) should only allow their customers to advertise their registered IP space and stop things like this from happening. I'm looking at Sprint's BGP policy (http://www.sprint.net/bgppolicy.htm) and it appears that they are way too trusting. They expect their customers to do everything right, and for someone with little or no knowledge of setting up BGP, they could quickly cause havoc for Sprint's or other carriers' networks. This is especially interesting since they offer no BGP help what so ever according to this document. Also according to this document, the customer is responsible for all filtering, which is an extremely poor practice. I wonder how long it will take for a Sprint customer to advertise a default route out and I wonder how many sites it would effectively blackhole. Regards, Joe Shaw - jshaw@insync.net NetAdmin - Insync Internet Services On Tue, 10 Feb 1998, Bruce Robertson wrote:
Currently, one half of our /18 is being erroneously advertised by Sprint (207.228.0.0/19). This, naturally, is causing us no end of trouble. Sprint, meanwhile, blames a third party. This has been going on for over 24 hours.
First, if you're reading this and you're the culprit, please stop advertising 207.228.0.0/19.
Second, I'm soliciting advice from others who have experienced this. How did you get results from the culprits? Can you recommend an attorney who is familiar with the issues, in case we decide to recover our lost revenue stream?
Thanks!
-- Bruce Robertson, President/CEO Great Basin Internet Services, Inc. +1-702-348-7299 fax: +1-702-348-9412