Can you stop this?

You caused again a massive prefix spike/flap, and as the internet is not centered around NA (shock horror!) a number of operators in Asia and Australia go effected by your “expirment” and had no idea what was happening or why.

Get a sandbox like every other researcher, as of now we have black holed and filtered your whole ASN, and have reccomended others do the same. 

On Wed, 23 Jan 2019 at 1:19 am, Italo Cunha <cunha@dcc.ufmg.br> wrote:

NANOG,

This is a reminder that this experiment will resume tomorrow
(Wednesday, Jan. 23rd). We will announce 184.164.224.0/24 carrying a
BGP attribute of type 0xff (reserved for development) between 14:00
and 14:15 GMT.

On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 10:05 AM Italo Cunha <cunha@dcc.ufmg.br> wrote:
>
> NANOG,
>
> We would like to inform you of an experiment to evaluate alternatives
> for speeding up adoption of BGP route origin validation (research
> paper with details [A]).
>
> Our plan is to announce prefix 184.164.224.0/24 with a valid
> standards-compliant unassigned BGP attribute from routers operated by
> the PEERING testbed [B, C]. The attribute will have flags 0xe0
> (optional transitive [rfc4271, S4.3]), type 0xff (reserved for
> development), and size 0x20 (256bits).
>
> Our collaborators recently ran an equivalent experiment with no
> complaints or known issues [A], and so we do not anticipate any
> arising. Back in 2010, an experiment using unassigned attributes by
> RIPE and Duke University caused disruption in Internet routing due to
> a bug in Cisco routers [D, CVE-2010-3035]. Since then, this and other
> similar bugs have been patched [e.g., CVE-2013-6051], and new BGP
> attributes have been assigned (BGPsec-path) and adopted (large
> communities). We have successfully tested propagation of the
> announcements on Cisco IOS-based routers running versions 12.2(33)SRA
> and 15.3(1)S, Quagga 0.99.23.1 and 1.1.1, as well as BIRD 1.4.5 and
> 1.6.3.
>
> We plan to announce 184.164.224.0/24 from 8 PEERING locations for a
> predefined period of 15 minutes starting 14:30 GMT, from Monday to
> Thursday, between the 7th and 22nd of January, 2019 (full schedule and
> locations [E]). We will stop the experiment immediately in case any
> issues arise.
>
> Although we do not expect the experiment to cause disruption, we
> welcome feedback on its safety and especially on how to make it safer.
> We can be reached at disco-experiment@googlegroups.com.
>
> Amir Herzberg, University of Connecticut
> Ethan Katz-Bassett, Columbia University
> Haya Shulman, Fraunhofer SIT
> Ítalo Cunha, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
> Michael Schapira, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
> Tomas Hlavacek, Fraunhofer SIT
> Yossi Gilad, MIT
>
> [A] https://conferences.sigcomm.org/hotnets/2018/program.html
> [B] http://peering.usc.edu
> [C] https://goo.gl/AFR1Cn
> [D] https://labs.ripe.net/Members/erik/ripe-ncc-and-duke-university-bgp-experiment
> [E] https://goo.gl/nJhmx1

--

Ben Cooper

Chief Executive Officer

PacketGG - Multicast

M(Telstra): 0410 411 301

M(Optus):  0434 336 743

E: ben@packet.gg & ben@multicast.net.au

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W: https://multicast.net.au

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