On 29 Mar 2020, at 00:35, Harlan Stenn <stenn@nwtime.org> wrote:
Ragnar,
On 3/28/2020 4:09 PM, Ragnar Sundblad wrote:
On 28 Mar 2020, at 23:58, Harlan Stenn <stenn@nwtime.org> wrote:
Steven Sommars said:
The secure time transfer of NTS was designed to avoid amplification attacks.
Uh, no.
Yes, it was.
As Steven said, “The secure time transfer of NTS was designed to avoid amplification attacks”. I would even say - to make it impossible to use for amplification attacks.
Please tell me how. I've been part of this specific topic since the original NTS spec. For what y'all are saying to be true, there are some underlying assumptions that would need to be in place, and they are clearly not in place now and won't be until people update their software, and even better, tweak their configs.
The NTS protected NTP request is always of the same size, or in some cases larger, than the NTS protected NTP response. It is carefully designed to work that way. Hence, [what Steven said].
If you understand what's going on from the perspective of both the client and the server and think about the various cases, I think you'll see what I mean.
Hopefully, no-one exposes mode 6 or mode 7 on the internet anymore at least not unauthenticated, and at least not the commands that are not safe from amplification attacks. Those just can not be allowed to be used anonymously.
But mode 6/7 is completely independent of NTS.
Exactly. No one needs to, or should, expose mode6/7 at all. They were designed at a time when the internet was thought to be nice place were people behaved, decades ago, today they are just huge pains in the rear. Sadly allowing anonymous mode 6/7 was left in there far to long (admittedly being wise in hindsight is so much easier than in advance). And here we are, with UDP port 123 still being abused by the bad guys, and still being filtered by the networks.
It's disingenuous for people to imply otherwise.
I couldn’t say, I don’t even know of an example of someone who does. Ragnar