Unfortunately, it is way too easy for people to inject routes into the global routing system. I think most of the folks on the list can attest to that. :-) - ferg On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 1:20 AM, Martin T <m4rtntns@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi,
as probably many of you know, it's possible to create a "route" object to RIPE database for an address space which is allocated outside the RIPE region using the RIPE-NCC-RPSL-MNT maintainer object. For example an address space is from APNIC or ARIN region and AS is from RIPE region. For example a LIR in RIPE region creates a "route" object to RIPE database for 157.166.266.0/24(used by Turner Broadcasting System) prefix without having written permission from Turner Broadcasting System and as this LIR uses up-link providers who create prefix filters automatically according to RADb database entries, this ISP is soon able to announce this 157.166.266.0/24 prefix to Internet. This should disturb the availability of the real 157.166.266.0/24 network on Internet? Has there been such situations in history? Isn't there a method against such hijacking? Or have I misunderstood something and this isn't possible?
regards, Martin
-- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson fergdawgster(at)gmail.com