Dean Anderson writes...
There isn't a simple knob, but then it isn't simple to know what a forgery is. You to have tell the router. The router doesn't know what you and other people "own", but you can tell it. I'd say there isn't a way to make a simple on/off knob for that, because there isn't any way to tell who you will transit for and who you won't.
[access list example not included] It could be simple knob, and I believe it is simple to know what a forgery is. If the source address, when treated as a destination and used to look up the routing entries (all of them), indicates a return path scope that includes the actual interface or interface:gateway that the packet did arrive from, then it is most likely not a forgery, whereas if the arrival interface or interface:gateway is not in the list, it most likely is a forgery. While this might break some extreme cases of asymmetric routing, it does appear to me to be sufficiently able to filter enough source forgeries as to seriously discourge the practice. Unlike access lists, this would be very easy to configure. Unlike access lists, it could default to enabled, which I think it should be. Its costs in CPU time (mostly the route lookup) could be made up for to some degree be not having to have so many access list entries to accomplish the same effect. And you won't have to go update all your configurations when a new network block is acquired, or a customer comes online with portable address space or dual-homes (a serious situation for backbone providers). -- Phil Howard | die0spam@spammer1.net no3way64@no6place.edu suck4it4@dumb3ads.net phil | stop2ads@spammer8.net no00ads0@spammer0.edu eat20me0@dumb5ads.org at | no28ads4@noplace3.edu die6spam@spam3mer.edu eat4this@no7where.com ipal | blow1me7@dumbads3.com eat4this@anyplace.edu ads8suck@spam8mer.com dot | eat0this@no7place.org blow7me6@spammer1.org blow6me3@nowhere3.edu com | ads1suck@no5where.com a1b3c3d2@anyplace.edu no0way56@no2place.org