An attacker who can "only" attack BGP is different than someone who can splice into your undersea cables undetected. Prepare for the worst appears to be the best SOP now. On Fri, Dec 6, 2013 at 12:44 PM, Warren Bailey <wbailey@satelliteintelligencegroup.com> wrote:
That didn¹t seem to work for google.. ;)
On 12/6/13, 9:39 AM, "Brandon Galbraith" <brandon.galbraith@gmail.com> wrote:
If your flows are a target, or your data is of an extremely sensitive nature (diplomatic, etc), why aren't you moving those bits over something more private than IP (point to point L2, MPLS)? This doesn't work for the VoIP target mentioned, but foreign ministries should most definitely not be trusting encryption alone.
brandon
On Fri, Dec 6, 2013 at 12:05 PM, Jared Mauch <jared@puck.nether.net> wrote:
On Dec 6, 2013, at 12:38 PM, Eugen Leitl <eugen@leitl.org> wrote:
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/12/bgp-hijacking-belarus-iceland/
Someone¹s Been Siphoning Data Through a Huge Security Hole in the Internet ...
In 2008, two security researchers at the DefCon hacker conference demonstrated a massive security vulnerability in the worldwide internet traffic-routing system ‹ a vulnerability so severe that it could allow intelligence agencies, corporate spies or criminals to intercept massive amounts of data, or even tamper with it on the fly. ...
Yes, nothing new to see here, networks don't do BGP filtering well, no Film at 11?
I've detected 11.6 million of these events since 2008 just looking at the route-views data. Most recently the past two days 701 has done a large MITM of traffic.
In other news, you can go read the other thread on this that happened already.
http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2013-November/062257.html
- Jared