Hi, I would like to trigger feedback from you (people running BGP) on http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-francois-limited-scope-specifics-00 This draft documents a threat to the respect of BGP policies of an AS. These can be violated due to the injection of more specific routes whose propagation is limited by misbehavior/mis-configurations of *other* ASes. That is, your peer screw up, and you perform transit for free to him as a result. I'd like to receive information about operational experiences of this issue from people who know they already experienced such violations, either by being the victim or being the unfortunate attacker. Info would be : How did you detect the violation ? How did you / your peers reacted ? Did you take actions to avoid the problem in the future ? Up to know, I've only found people who've been the attacker by mistake. I'd like to hear the victims ! I'd also like to hear about people who know they've never been the victim/attacker : just tell me how you know it ;-) As the doc is an internet-draft, I'd ask you to answer in private or on grow@ietf.org (subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/grow ) Best regards, Pierre Francois.