On Tue, 11 Nov 1997, John A. Tamplin wrote:
Actually, I view it the other way. If someone is announcing routes for one of our prefixes, connectivity is at least partially broken for that prefix,
I think the whole point of filtering is that you will not send packets to that newly announced route. You can access-list it and if you suddenly see matching on some deny, then you can investigate at somewhere like nitrous and figure out who is announcing what. In general, I would not be willing to sacrifice the performance of the people who are paying me m0ney just to be able to quickly? ascertain who is causing the problem.
BTW, this has happened to us twice, and both times the offender was a direct competitor in one of our local markets. Does anybody have any feel for how often these "accidents" are not accidents?
Time to slap the kiddies for playing with daddy's router. brad reynolds ber@cwru.edu "Faith: not wanting to know what is true." -- Friedrich Nietzsche