radar.qrator.net serves as a complementary view to bgp.he.net and AS205869 does show as peered with AS6939 there. Jason On Tue, Jul 24, 2018 at 3:02 PM Ronald F. Guilmette <rfg@tristatelogic.com> wrote:
In message <20180724.090316.47077931.sthaug@nethelp.no>, sthaug@nethelp.no wrote:
All prefixes still visible here (Oslo, Norway), through HE. Here's your original table augmented with the AS paths I see on our border routers:
ASN Route AS path ----------------------------------------------- 10510 216.238.64.0/18 6939 205869 32226 10510 10737 207.183.96.0/20 6939 205869 7827 10737 10800 192.110.32.0/19 6939 205869 11717 10800 19529 104.143.112.0/20 6939 205869 11324 19529 19529 198.14.0.0/20 6939 205869 7827 19529 19529 198.32.208.0/20 6939 205869 7827 19529 19529 206.41.128.0/20 6939 205869 11324 19529 30237 192.73.128.0/20 6939 205869 11717 30237 30237 192.73.144.0/20 6939 205869 11717 30237 30237 192.73.160.0/20 6939 205869 11717 30237 30237 192.73.176.0/20 6939 205869 11717 30237
Thanks for checking this. I gather from the other posts in this thread that this has already been rectified, and that the above CIDRs are no longer reachable via HE.NET, correct?
Even if that's the case, I'm still left scratching my head. There's a bit of a mystery here, or at least something that I don't quite understand. (NOTE: I've never laid claim to being anything like an "expert" when it comes to all this routing stuff. I just muddle along and try to do the best I can with the limited knowledge and understanding that I have.)
So, here's what's perplexing me. You reported that all eleven of the routes in the table above had AS paths that directly connected Universal IP Solution Corp. (AS205869) to Hurricane Electric (AS6939). And yet, when I looked at the following page, both yesterday and today, I see no reported connection between those two ASNs:
https://bgp.he.net/AS205869#_peers
I already knew before now that each of the alleged peerings reported on similar pages on the bgp.he.net web site had to be taken with a grain of salt, mostly or entirely because of the kinds of hanky panky and path forgery being undertaken by various bad guys. In at least some cases, these screwy games appear to have caused bgp.he.net to list peerings that didn't actually exist.
But this is a rather entirely different case. In this case, it seems that one very notable peering that -did- in fact exist, between AS205869 and AS6939, was not reported at all on the bgp.he.net page linked to above.
To be clear, I most definitely am *not* suggeting any sort of deliberate obfsucation here, on anybody's part. Rather, I just suspect that some of the algorithms that are used to produce the peers lists on bgp.he.net could use some... ah... fine tuning. It certainly seems to be true that in this case, one very important peering was utterly missed by the algorithms that power bgp.he.net.
Regards, rfg