On Sat, 15 Oct 2005, Tony Li wrote:
I don't want to speak for Daniel, nor other operators really, but a solution that doesn't allow an operator to traffic engineer internally or externally is just not workable. For the same reasons quoted in your other messages to me: "Increased reliance on the Internet"
There's nothing in any multi-prefix multihoming solution that prevents an operator from internal or external traffic engineering. There just isn't a single explicit prefix to manipulate. If, within any given routing domain, you choose to carry a longer prefix and manipulate it to whatever extent your vendor's BGP permits, you and your consenting adult peers are free to do so. Do not, however, expect the rest of us to carry your traffic engineering prefixes. We are not interested.
I'm aware that routing table bloat is a problem, I'm also aware that just doing what we do today tomorrow will probably cause lots of expense, failure, or pain at some point in the future. I can't see that source/dest pairs being basically meaningless and large sinks or sources of traffic being anonymous is going to help either. (shim6 provides the possibility for end nodes to 'renumber' and change their source/dest at will, potentially playing havoc with traffic patterns, potentially even inducing 'failure' in the network interconnects along the way.
agreed, but it doesn't seem that, until recently atleast, there was much operator participation. Hopefully that's changing for the better :)
Hopefully, that will reach a point where the operators show up and participate at IETF, rather than the IETF coming to NANOG.
agreed.