What you seem to have failed to understand is that most traffic hijacks on the internet are not malicious in nature, they are "fat finger" incidents where someone has accidentally announced something they did not intend to, either because of faulty software (the infamous "BGP optimizer") or someone leaking internal "blocks" such as the Pakistan/YouTube incident -- certifying the origin of a prefix allows you to mitigate most of this as the origin AS will change. Anyone seen deliberately causing hijacks is likely to be depeered very quickly -- commercial pressure rather than technical.
I was reading the above exchange, and I do have a question linked to your last affirmation. To give you some context, the last 2021 ENISA report seem to suggest that internet traffic is "casually registered" by X actors to apply post Retrospective decryption (excerpt below). This would be at odds with your (deescalating) affirmation that hijacks are non-malicious and they are de-peered quickly, unless you pinpoint complete flux arrest only. Are there any reportings/indicators... that look into internet flux constant monitoring capabilities/capacities? Thanks.
Excerpt from the introduction: "What makes matters worse is
that any cipher text intercepted by an attacker today can be decrypted
by the attacker as soon as he has access to a large quantum computer
(Retrospective decryption). Analysis of Advanced Persistent Threats
(APT) and Nation State capabilities, along with whistle blowers’
revelations have shown that threat actors can and are casually recording
all Internet traffic in their data centers and that they select
encrypted traffic as interesting and worth storing.This means that any
data encrypted using any of the standard public-key systems today will
need to be considered compromised once a quantum computer exists and
there is no way to protect it retroactively, because a copy of the
ciphertexts in the hands of the attacker. This means that data that
needs to remain confidential after the arrival of quantum computers need
to be encrypted with alternative means"
Best to all,
Dora