I also see some of this from France. On this incident/error, even if tools like BGPMon, watchmy.net and others exactly did their roles, I asking myself if there are some other public tools which can help. CIDR returns Chinanet as the biggest announcer (but could be the case previously) 97074688 Largest address span announced by an AS (/32s) AS4134: CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street on http://www.cidr-report.org/as2.0/ Same stats from http://www.ris.ripe.net/dashboard/4134 I'm not sure either of them is real-time. There is also a "hole" in http://www.cymru.com/BGP/bgp_prefixes.html So, how each one has assess the impact of this on his network ? How could we check where route's propagation stop(ed) ? Thanks to Renesys and Team Cymru for the stats of how many prefixes/countries where affected. I hope most Tier1 operators have rules to filter too big announces changes to avoid the Youtube/Pakistan Telecom effect or i-root as said previously. thanks Best regards, Jul Grzegorz Janoszka wrote on 08/04/10 18:33:
Just half an hour ago China Telecom hijacked one of our prefixes:
Your prefix: X.Y.Z.0/19: Prefix Description: NETNAME Update time: 2010-04-08 15:58 (UTC) Detected by #peers: 1 Detected prefix: X.Y.Z.0/19 Announced by: AS23724 (CHINANET-IDC-BJ-AP IDC, China Telecommunications Corporation) Upstream AS: AS4134 (CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street) ASpath: 39792 4134 23724 23724
Luckily it had to be limited as only one BGPmon peer saw it. Anyone else noticed it?