On Sun, Feb 6, 2011 at 11:15 AM, Joel Jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com> wrote:
So assuming this operates on a pollution model the victims of routing table bloat are compensated by the routing table pollutors for the use of the slots which they have to carry. so I take the marginal cost of
In this case the "victims" are the other ASes, and the "pollutors" are the ASes that announce lots of blocks. However, the pollution is also something the "victims" need, so it's not really pollution at all, unless an excessive number of slots are used it's more "meat" than trash, the pollution model doesn't exactly make sense; the basic announced routes for connectivity are not like pollution. They are more like fertilizer... nutrients that are absolutely essential when utilized in appropriate quantities, but harmful in excessive quantity. And if too many use them in excessive quantity, then polluted runoff is released as a side-effect. There is an assumption that waste is so rampant, that a per-slot cost would lead to efficiency, and no loss of connectivity or stability, but there appears to be lack of data validating the suggestion. Private "routing slot markets" could be a huge can of worms... and we thought peering spats were bad. Some $BIG_DSL_PROVIDER is going to refuse to pay some $BIG_HOSTING_PROVIDER (or anyone else) for their routing slots, they will know that their size makes it too unpallatable for anyone else on the market to _not give them_ the slots, even if they are one of the larger polluters with numerous announcements. Other providers simply can't afford to be the provider whose customers can't reach $HIGHLY_POPULAR_WEB_SITE. If $BIG_HOSTING_PROVIDER's routers do not have $BIG_DSL_PROVIDER's routes, $BIG_HOSTING_PROVIDER's customers will scream, and jump ship for $other_hosting_provider that has $big_dsl_provider routability. There will be other $BIG_COMPANYs that as well have superior negotiating position, and noone else will be in a position to discard their routes, when they refuse to pay, or negotiate a price that reflects their superior position (rather than one reflecting cost of their excessive use of routing slots). So first of all... if there's a buying and selling of routing slots a "market". It cannot be a voluntary market, or it will simply lead to a chaotic situation where numerous big providers get free routes, and everyone else has to pay the big providers extortionate/disproportionately high fees because they _have to have those slots_ due to so many of their hosting customers requiring $big_provider connectivity. To ascertain a market in the first place... need to know.... How is the number of slots that will be on the market determined? Who gets to initialize the market; create and sell paid 'routing slots', and what will give them the power to enforce all users of routing slots buy from them... Are these one-time purchases... or do 'routing slot' purchases incur maintenance fees? How would the 'ownership' of a slot get verified, when a route is announced? How is it decided how much cost 'repayment' each AS gets? Who is going to make sure each AS fully populates their table with each routing slot they have been paid to fill and they do not populate any slots that were not purchased by the originator on the open market? The idea of 'ownership' of other people's things (slots on other people's routers) generally requires the AS owning those things to sell them. That would suggest each announcer of routes having to go to each AS and paying each AS a fee for slots on their routers --- not only would it be expensive, but the communication overhead required would be massive. So clearly any market would need to be centralized; transactions would need to happen through one entity. One buy/sell transaction for a routing slot on _all_ participating ASes. Seems like a tall order
the slots that I need subtract the royalities I recieve from the other participants and if I'm close to the mean number of slots per participant then it nets out to zero.
-- -JH