In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can. Inferred improvements during Dec 2022: ASN Name Fixed-By 400328 2022-12-25 208287 BAK 2022-12-26 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Dec 2022: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 209 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST 2016-08-16 2022-12-28 6128 CABLE-NET-1 2016-09-03 2022-12-22 20412 CLARITY-TELECOM 2016-09-30 2022-12-31 6181 FUSE-NET 2016-10-10 2022-12-31 271 BCNET 2016-10-24 2022-12-30 12083 WOW-INTERNET 2016-11-09 2022-12-30 14576 HOSTING-SOLUTIONS 2016-11-20 2022-12-28 852 ASN852 2017-04-16 2022-12-29 33452 RW 2018-09-19 2022-12-31 21804 ACCESS-SK 2019-06-09 2022-12-31 398836 NP-NETWORKS 2021-03-12 2022-12-25 22773 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC 2021-10-24 2022-12-28 397086 LAYER-HOST-HOUSTON 2022-06-16 2022-12-18 400517 2022-10-03 2022-12-07 11976 FIDN 2022-11-16 2022-12-31 12183 TALKIE-COMMUNICATIONS 2022-12-10 2022-12-27 33185 HIVE-DATA-CENTER 2022-12-11 2022-12-25 399296 2022-12-30 2022-12-30 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=usa,can&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info@caida.org