The interesting thing is that I'm not seeing any new "hosts" from those subnets in passive dns. It almost seems that their purpose for hijacking the space was to direct traffic to themselves, possibly for collecting login attempts. Andrew Fried andrew.fried@gmail.com On 1/31/12 1:00 PM, Kelvin Williams wrote:
Greetings all.
We've been in a 12+ hour ordeal requesting that AS19181 (Cavecreek Internet Exchange) immediately filter out network blocks that are being advertised by ASAS33611 (SBJ Media, LLC) who provided to them a forged LOA.
The routes for networks: 208.110.48.0/20, 63.246.112.0/20, and 68.66.112.0/20 are registered in various IRRs all as having an origin AS 11325 (ours), and are directly allocated to us.
The malicious hijacking is being announced as /24s therefore making route selection pick them.
Our customers and services have been impaired. Does anyone have any contacts for anyone at Cavecreek that would actually take a look at ARINs WHOIS, and IRRs so the networks can be restored and our services back in operation?
Additionally, does anyone have any suggestion for mitigating in the interim? Since we can't announce as /25s and IRRs are apparently a pipe dream.