On Mon, Jan 30, 2006 at 09:48:13AM +0000, Michael.Dillon@btradianz.com wrote:
Wouldn't a well-operated network of IRRs used by 95% of network operators be able to meet all three of your requirements?
We have such a database (used by Verio and others), but the Panix incident happened anyway due to bit rot. We've got to find a way to fix the layer 8 problems before we can make improvements at layer 3.
If an IRR suffers from bit-rot, then I don't consider it to be "well-operated" and therefore it cannot be considered to be part of a well-operated network of IRRs.
The point is that the tools exist. The failing is in how those tools are managed. In other words this is an operational problem on both the scale of a single IRR and on the scale of the IRR system. Is this what you mean by a "layer 8" problem?
Take it up with the people putting data into the system, not the IRR operators. Anyone who is behind an IRR-based provider (like Verio) has motivation to put data into the system ("hey look I do this and now routing works"), but there is no motivation to take stale data OUT of the system. I can't even begin to count the number of networks I know who theoretically "use" IRR who don't even know HOW to remove data, let alone make any active attempt to do so when a customer leaves or a route is returned. Combine this with the idiots who run around proxy registering routes for other people based on everything they see in the table (gee theres a good idea, define filters for what is allowed in the table based on what we see people trying to put into the table, brilliant!) and you quickly see how IRR data becomes stale and eventually worthless. I'll save the rest of my rant for the presentation on the subject in Dallas. :) -- Richard A Steenbergen <ras@e-gerbil.net> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras GPG Key ID: 0xF8B12CBC (7535 7F59 8204 ED1F CC1C 53AF 4C41 5ECA F8B1 2CBC)