bill,all, On Mon, Jan 23, 2006 at 12:08:11PM -0800, Bill Woodcock wrote:
On Mon, 23 Jan 2006, Josh Karlin wrote: > The idea is simply to consider 'suspicious' looking routes as a last > resort in the decision process (~1 day). Thus if no alternative route > for a prefix exists, the suspicious route is used regardless, no harm > done.
It seems like most of the routers which would need to make this decision wouldn't have adequate information upon which to do so...
not necessarily. the decision could be made in "near real time" by building prefix filters based on the algorithms that josh and co have worked on and leaving a 'default deny' in place. this moves the routing decision off of the router (which i agree does not have the history or resources to take these additional vectors of information into account) and over to a server with more storage and computational capacity. it has the side effect of denying announcements of valid prefixes from customers that are not in the prefix list until the list is next updated, but we already pay that price now; well, networks that maintain prefix filter lists on customer-facing ports pay that price now. this just describes a different way of building and maintaining those lists. the idea of incorporating history into the validation process for routing tremendously useful and worth considering seriously. at least until we get all signed updates. how is that whole thing going? :-) t. -- _____________________________________________________________________ todd underwood chief of operations & security renesys - internet intelligence todd@renesys.com www.renesys.com