earlier on Twitter Krebs said he was hit by 665Gbps attack (so says Prolexic/Akamai). Could be ongoing/related. ____________ Justin Paine Head of Trust & Safety CloudFlare Inc. PGP: BBAA 6BCE 3305 7FD6 6452 7115 57B6 0114 DE0B 314D On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 8:21 PM, Mel Beckman <mel@beckman.org> wrote:
While I was reading the krebsonsecurity.com article cited below, the site, hosted at Akamai address 72.52.7.144, became non responsive and now appears to be offline. Traceroutes stop before the Akamai-SWIPed border within Telia, as if blackholed (but adjacent IPs pass through to Akamai):
traceroute to krebsonsecurity.com (72.52.7.144), 64 hops max, 40 byte packets 1 router1.sb.becknet.com (206.83.0.1) 0.771 ms 0.580 ms 0.342 ms 2 206-190-77-9.static.twtelecom.net (206.190.77.9) 0.715 ms 1.026 ms 0.744 ms 3 ae1-90g.ar7.lax1.gblx.net (67.17.75.18) 9.532 ms 6.567 ms 2.912 ms 4 ae10.edge1.losangeles9.level3.net (4.68.111.21) 2.919 ms 2.925 ms 2.904 ms 5 telia-level3-4x10g.losangeles.level3.net (4.68.70.130) 3.981 ms 3.567 ms 3.401 ms 6 sjo-b21-link.telia.net (62.115.116.40) 11.209 ms 11.140 ms 11.161 ms 7 * * * 8 * * * 9 * * * 10 * * *
Weird coincidence?
-mel beckman
On Sep 20, 2016, at 6:46 PM, Hugo Slabbert <hugo@slabnet.com> wrote:
Lucy, you got some (*serious*) 'splainin to do...
http://research.dyn.com/2016/09/backconnects-suspicious-bgp-hijacks/ http://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/09/ddos-mitigation-firm-has-history-of-hijac...
-- Hugo Slabbert | email, xmpp/jabber: hugo@slabnet.com pgp key: B178313E | also on Signal
On Sun 2016-Sep-18 22:25:44 -0400, Tom Beecher <beecher@beecher.cc> wrote:
So after reading your explanation of things...
Your technical protections for your client proved sufficient to handle the attack. You took OFFENSIVE action by hijacking the IP space. By your own statements, it was only in response to threats against your company. You were no longer providing DDoS protection to a client. You were exacting a vendetta against someone who was being MEAN to you. Even if that person probably deserved it, you still cannot do what was done.
I appreciate the desire to want to protect friends and family from anonymous threats, and also realize how ill equipped law enforcement usually is while something like this is occurring.
However, in my view, by taking the action you did, you have shown your company isn't ready to be operating in the security space. Being threatened by bad actors is a nominal part of doing business in the security space. Unfortunately you didn't handle it well, and I think that will stick to you for a long time.
On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Bryant Townsend <bryant@backconnect.com> wrote:
@ca & Matt - No, we do not plan to ever intentionally perform a non-authorized BGP hijack in the future.
@Steve - Correct, the attack had already been mitigated. The decision to hijack the attackers IP space was to deal with their threats, which if carried through could have potentially lead to physical harm. Although the hijack gave us a unique insight into the attackers services, it was not a factor that influenced my decision.
@Blake & Mel - We will likely cover some of these questions in a future blog post.