In my honest opinion, it's the fact that they're going to be using random AS's without prior consent from those that hold said AS's, and only giving operators a week to opt-out of something that they never opted into in the first place.
Regards,
Peter
Short Disclaimer: I frequently use the PEERING testbed myself, so I'm
genuinely interested in where and why people draw the boundary of what's
fine and what's not.
Iirc., the route collectors see a (drastically varying) number of
poisoned routes (assuming everything within a loop is poisoning) in the
DFZ at any point in time, affecting a (drastically varying) number of
ASNs, prefixes, and paths. So why would you expect this experiment to be
noticeable at all---I mean, compared to the day-to-day, "1% of the
Internet is beyond broken and does Yolo things" noise? Very similar
experiments have run in the past (e.g., [1] in 2018); did you notice them?
Would poisoning be tolerated if the PEERING testbed would be, e.g., some
security-obsessed org that wants to avoid that your infrastructure
touches any of its precious packets during the forwarding process? I
guess what I want to figure out is: Is it the intention behind the
poisoning experiments that bothers people or is the act of poisoning
itself?
Kind regards,
Lars
[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.03716.pdf
On 02.05.22 16:33, Raymond Dijkxhoorn via NANOG wrote:
> Hi!
>
>> > If I am interpreting this correctly that you are just going to yolo a
>> > bunch of random ASNs to poison paths with, perhaps you should consider
>> > getting explicit permission for the ASNs you want to use instead.
>> >
>> > A lot of operators monitor the DFZ for prefixes with their ASN in the
>> > path, and wouldn't appreciate random support tickets because their NOC
>> > got some alert. :)
>
>> Exatly that. How about you ask people to OPT-IN instead of you wanting
>> people to OPT-OUT of whatever experiment you feel you need to do with
>> other people's resources.
>
>> When you the last time you asked the entire internet?s permission to
>> announce routes ?
>
> I dont exactly understand what you try to say its not about the route
> its about the path.
>
> If the insert 'my ASN' i certainly will complain wherever i can and no
> i will not opt out from that. I will assume they just do use my ASN.
> Weird thought?
>
> Bye, Raymond
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