On 10/04/2014 10:23 AM, Jay Ashworth wrote:
Majdi makes an excellent point, but I want to clarify it, so no one misses the important subtext:
It is OK for an enterprise wifi system to make this sort of attack *on rogue APs which are trying to pretend to be part of it (same ESSID).
It is NOT OK for an enterprise wifi system to make this sort of attack on APs which *are not trying to pretend to be part of it* (we'll call this The Marriott Attack from now on, right?)
Rogue AP prevention is a *useful* feature in enterprise wifi systems... but *that isn't what Marriott was doing*.
So I work in a small office in a building that has many "enterprise" wifi's I can see whether I like it or not. What if one of them decided that our wifi was "rogue" and started trying to stamp it out? Mike, this seems like it might be a universally bad idea...