In message <d99aaed40901241734g691cd581q20e9c88eb76093b7@mail.gmail.com>, Marti n Hannigan writes:
On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 8:01 PM, Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews@isc.org> wrote:
In message <8C5F1FEC-FF51-4BA2-A762-C13BC275E806@virtualized.org>, David Conrad writes:
It would seem that as ISPs implement DPI and protocol-specific traffic shaping, they damage the arguments that they can make claiming they have "common carrier" status with the inherent immunities that status provides. I can hear the argument now: if an ISP can throttle BitTorrent (or whatever) for specific nodes, why can't they also limit the source addresses of packets coming from those nodes?
They can and should. I suspect many of them do as they usually apply these filters to home networks.
BCP 38 is ~10 years old now. It should have been factored into the purchasing decision of all the current equipement. If it wasn't then the operator was negligent.
Mark
BCP 38 isn't a license, it's a technique.
There are plenty of cases in common law where as a owner of something and you havn't taken reasonable steps to protect or prevent injury that, were well known, you will be proved to be negligent. BCP 38 is falling into that sort of category. Every operator here should be worried about what will happen when someone decides to sue them to recover damaged caused by spoofed traffic. It's just a matter of time before this happens. Remember every router inspects packets to the level required to implement BCP 38. This is not deep packet inspection. This is address inspection which every router performs. Did you know about "BCP 38"? What steps did you take to implement "BCP 38"? I suspect that a lawyer will be able to demonstrate to a judge that even as a common carrier that a operator should have been deploying BCP 38. Mark
-- Martin Hannigan martin@theicelandguy.com p: +16178216079
-- Mark Andrews, ISC 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: Mark_Andrews@isc.org