Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2006 19:55:39 -0400 From: Joseph S D Yao <jsdy@center.osis.gov> To: Fergie <fergdawg@netzero.net> Cc: nanog@merit.edu Subject: Re: fyi-- [dns-operations] early key rollover for dlv.isc.org
On Fri, Sep 22, 2006 at 11:39:51PM +0000, Fergie wrote:
Hmmm. It wouldn't have anything to do with prime numbers, now would it? :-)
Well, yes, but there are an infinite number of them.
Of course, 17 is the most prime of them all.
isc.org announced the early key rollover just as a discussion about "exponent 3 damage spreads" on the cryptography list was heating up. This discussion started with a statement that:
I've just noticed that BIND is vulnerable to:
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20060905.txt
Executive summary:
RRSIGs can be forged if your RSA key has exponent 3, which is BIND's default. Note that the issue is in the resolver, not the server.
Fix:
Upgrade OpenSSL.
So I thought that the early key rollover was due to this. Yet it seems to me that this discussion is still recommending that "-e 3" be used. Regards, GRegory hicks ------------------------------------------------------------------- I am perfectly capable of learning from my mistakes. I will surely learn a great deal today. "A democracy is a sheep and two wolves deciding on what to have for lunch. Freedom is a well armed sheep contesting the results of the decision." - Benjamin Franklin "The best we can hope for concerning the people at large is that they be properly armed." --Alexander Hamilton