-----Original Message----- From: Joe Abley [mailto:jabley@isc.org] Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2005 12:05 PM To: Hannigan, Martin Cc: NANOG list Subject: Re: Proper authentication model
On 12 Jan 2005, at 11:53, Hannigan, Martin wrote:
You mean you'd *request* a different path from different providers.
Provisioning a circuit from two different ^providers^, other than your OC3 provider.
I realise that's what you meant.
My point was that competing, differently-named and organisationally-separate suppliers of network services frequently use common suppliers for metro fibre, long-haul transport, building access, etc. Just because you buy different services from different providers doesn't mean there will be no common points of failure.
There may be common points of failure like a carrier hotel, but I haven't been told I couldn't see loop or longhaul maps when planning a circuit, except when buying from other than a carrier[1] or tier2. Primary and protect should be geographically seperated and if your carrier isn't buying access to BOTH conduits in your entrance facility, you should ask why. I just don't usually see this problem and I've *never* not been able to get into a facility remotely by the diversified frame M/S method. If we're talking semantics, order type 2 ds0s. [1] I'm talking RBOC tier1 for the most part. I would consider tier 1 to be SBC, AT&T, MCI, Sprint, etc. Facilities based. -M<