-----Original Message----- From: Todd Underwood [mailto:toddunder@gmail.com]
firstly: cgn puts reachability in the hands of a single organization. with the PAP System you have a set of distributed choices about reachability: different people can assess their different tolerance to certain kinds of unreachability.
Well, your proposal gives each "single organization" the same control as CGN. Except that if you announce somebody else's prefix, you're forcing your neighbors to choose whether to accept your announcement or the other organization's.
as i said in the presentation, the probability that there will be positive operational overhead for a prefix is related the the count of reuse within an association domain for a prefix ( p(Oop) = Cr(Ap) ). We need to work out how to subdivide which parts of the internet actually want to communicate directly with each other reliably and make sure that they are within association domains.
Yes, exactly. To minimize p(Oop), you need to consider what you'll leak. Generally, squat only when p(Oop) is very small, ideally when you can keep it all in. But seriously (and less scatalogically), when organizations can't get IPv4 addresses from their RIRs, some are likely to try using numbers registered to other organizations. In order of preference, they will use: 1) Globally unique, registered space 2) RFC1918 space 3) Space registered but unrouted (and unlikely to be routed) (see below) 4) Space registered and in use by someone very far away "Registered but unrouted" would include space that is in use in large private networks that aren't visible from your standard sources for route views, such as U.S. DoD (6, 11, 22, 26, 28, 29, 30 /8) or U.K. MoD (25/8). I've heard that some organizations are growing beyond rfc1918 space and starting to use addresses like these already (for devices not capable of IPv6) for internal networking (not publically routed). I believe this is generally considered bad citizenship, but I'm interested in why? Is there a range most people camp on? Lee