There is simple use case that will prove this page is giving false positive for their "name&shame" strategy. Any AS owner with default route only (yes it happens a lot) users will get: "YOUR ISP TERRIBLE, HIS BGP NOT SAFE!". But he have nothing to validate! His BGP is implemented safely, its just his upstream is not validating routes. On 2020-04-20 21:21, Andrey Kostin wrote:
Mark Tinka писал 2020-04-20 12:57:
On 20/Apr/20 18:50, Tom Beecher wrote:
I (and Ben, and a few others) are all too familiar with the ARIN madness around their TAL.
Simple - we just don't accept it, which means our networks will be unsafe against North American resources. Highly doubtful my organization is that interested in how the ARIN region may or may not impact our interest in deploying RPKI on this side of the planet, when the rest of the world are less mad about it :-).
So this means that there is no single source of truth for PRKI implementation all around the world and there are different shades, right? As a logical conclusion, the information provided on that page may be considered incorrect in terms of proclaiming particular network safe or not safe, but when it's claimed (sometimes blatantly) we now have to prove to our clients that we are not bad guys.
Kind regards, Andrey