On Wed, Jan 2, 2013 at 3:10 PM, George Herbert <george.herbert@gmail.com> wrote:
On Wed, Jan 2, 2013 at 11:36 AM, William Herrin <bill@herrin.us> wrote:
Communications using a key signed by a trusted third party suffer such attacks only with extraordinary difficulty on the part of the attacker. It's purely a technical matter.
While I agree with your general characterization of MIIM, the "extraordinary difficulty" here is not supported.
AFAICT someone finds a way to get themselves a certificate for a domain they don't control every couple years or so. The hole is promptly plugged (and the certs revoked) before much actually happens as a result. Has your experience been different? Are you, at this moment, able to acquire a falsely signed certificate for www.herrin.us that my web browser will accept? You're right that false certificates have been issued in the past. You're right that false certificates will be issued again in the future. No security apparatus is 100% effective. But if despite your resources you in particular can't make it happen in a timely manner, that's a meaningful barrier to mounting a man-in-the-middle attack against someone using properly signed certificates. Regards, Bill Herrin -- William D. Herrin ................ herrin@dirtside.com bill@herrin.us 3005 Crane Dr. ...................... Web: <http://bill.herrin.us/> Falls Church, VA 22042-3004