I agree that core stability is of utmost importance, but by randomly and somewhat unilaterally denying prefixes without verification of the validity of their origin...Hmm, lets see...AS 1 sending the 4.0.0.0 netblock across a direct peering point, but it get's nicked because of max-prefix, so it comes across through a multihomed downstream and all of a sudden, sorry little multihomed downstream is carrying 200 Megs of BBN transit. Oops! I would think that the only thing that this command protects is routers with slim memory profiles. Core routers should let the BGP decision process clean the routes, although I do get scared when 10,000 new routes appear over the weekend. After this weekends fiasco, I can see your reasons, though. Maybe RSNG is useful after all... Chris
-----Original Message----- From: Richard Irving [mailto:rirving@onecall.net] Sent: Monday, October 26, 1998 4:27 PM To: Martin, Christian Cc: 'nanog@merit.edu' Subject: Re: Clue's for Clue-less
No proof one way, or the other, Martin....
The only neighbors I lost on this one, dumped something they shouldn't..... If someone de-aggregates a /16, it fires off alarms.... Although these may be valid advertisements, We have opted for the "safe, rather than sorry" perspective. (Besides, the alarms *assure* prompt attention)
Running the internet requires a certain degree of Altruism. One should set policies that *protect* the core, rather than one's own....... ;)
Doing other than this will result in a global internet that is not reliable...And we all lose.
"The good of the many, outweigh the desires of the few"
(No matter *how* expensive a tie they wear ;)
PS: 11.2.xx and higher have this command...
Martin, Christian wrote:
Richard Irving Wrote:
To "You Know Who You Are":
Since some of the filtering policies on the core *seem* to not benefit the Internet as a whole... (or is that Hole ? ;)
May I suggest one that does:
neighbor WWW.XXX.YYY.ZZZ maximum-prefix XXXXX
It has a way of dropping "clue-nots"..... When they demonstrate said title.....
Your clueful attention appreciated.
Signed,
One *URKED* Core Operator.
What if it has a way of dropping big blocks? From what I've seen n sniffer traces, it depends on how the routes are stored in
the BGP table
that determines how they are advertised. This may have the effect of sinking large, valid netblocks. Unless you've seen otherwise...
-Chris