The same folks also followed up that workshop paper with a longer paper on the topic: https://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/sigRPKI.pdf On Tue, Jun 2, 2015 at 8:16 AM Dale W. Carder <dwcarder@wisc.edu> wrote:
Thus spake Roland Dobbins (rdobbins@arbor.net) on Tue, Jun 02, 2015 at 03:05:13PM +0700:
On 2 Jun 2015, at 11:07, Mark Andrews wrote:
If you have secure BGP deployed then you could extend the authenication to securely authenticate source addresses you emit and automate BCP38 filter generation and then you wouldn't have to worry about DNS, NTP, CHARGEN etc. reflecting spoofed traffic
This can be and is done by networks which originate routes and which practice good network hygiene, no PKI required.
But then we get into the customer of my customer (of my customer, of my customer . . .) problem, and this aren't quite so clear.
There are also potentially significant drawbacks to incorporating PKI
the routing space, including new potential DoS vectors against PKI-enabled routing elements, the potential for enumeration of routing elements, and
into the
possibility of building a true 'Internet kill switch' with effects far beyond what various governmental bodies have managed to do so far in the DNS space.
Once governments figured out what the DNS was, they started to use it as a ban-hammer - what happens in a PKIed routing system once they figure out what BGP is?
But nobody seems to be discussing these potential drawbacks, very much.
Start here: https://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/hotRPKI_full.pdf
Dale