If, for any reason, you want to opt out from us using your ASN for our experiments, you can do so in the following form before May 9:

https://forms.gle/ZvZaodndPhCqMvR89


If I am interpreting this correctly that you are just going to yolo a bunch of random ASNs to poison paths with, perhaps you should consider getting explicit permission for the ASNs you want to use instead. 

A lot of operators monitor the DFZ for prefixes with their ASN in the path, and wouldn't appreciate random support tickets because their NOC got some alert. :) 

On Mon, May 2, 2022 at 10:02 AM Alexandros Milolidakis <amilolid@gmail.com> wrote:

Hi NANOG,


We are a group of researchers from the KTH Royal Institute of Technology (Sweden). 

Starting from May 9 until May 31, we plan to conduct a research study involving AS-PATH poisoning to measure how reliable route collectors are to report BGP poisoned routes.


We will use the PEERING Testbed [1] to announce the following two prefixes:

 - 184.164.236.0/24 

 - 184.164.237.0/24

for our AS-path poisoning experiments.


The above experimental prefixes do not host any production services, hence user traffic will *not* be affected.

Furthermore, we will always start the AS-PATH with the correct ASN as the origin.

Lastly, to keep the AS-PATH short, we will announce no more than four Poisoned ASNs per announcement. The frequency of the announcements will not exceed four per hour.


If, for any reason, you want to opt out from us using your ASN for our experiments, you can do so in the following form before May 9:

https://forms.gle/ZvZaodndPhCqMvR89


I remain at your disposal for any questions.


Best regards,

Alexandros


[1] https://peering.ee.columbia.edu/